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ABSTRACT
Recent Delaware jurisprudence establishes a disinterested vote of
shareholders as the pathway out of heightened judicial scrutiny. The stated
rationale for this policy is that shareholders, the real party at interest, are better
protected by the ballot box than by the courtroom. As long as informed,
disinterested shareholders with an economic stake in the outcome of the vote
can effectively express their preferences through voting—the court need not
scrutinize the underlying transaction. Rather, it can defer to the outcome under
the business judgment rule.
But shareholder voting is not always as direct as this reasoning implies.
Instead, voting outcomes increasingly are determined not by those holding the
ultimate economic interest but rather by institutional intermediaries who buy,
hold, and vote shares on behalf of someone else. In this setting, there are several
predictable circumstances under which institutional voting interests will depart
from those of the underlying investors.
This Article develops a typology of institutional investor conflicts of interest.
We focus on mutual fund intermediaries, which are the key deciders of corporate
elections and represent the interests of millions of investors when voting. We
describe and document instances of Cross-Ownership Conflict (situations in
which funds have interests on both sides of a transaction), Corporate Client
Conflict (situations in which funds have an interest in currying favor with the
managers of portfolio companies), and Uniform Policy Conflict (situations in
which fund sponsors enforce a uniform voting policy irrespective of individual
fund objectives).
Our account provides a basis to reevaluate corporate law’s retreat from
heightened judicial scrutiny. When mutual fund voting is subject to the conflicts
we describe, the real parties in interest have not necessarily spoken in favor of
the transaction. As such, courts should consider a broader set of conflicts when
deciding whether the protection of the business judgment rule is warranted.
*
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INTRODUCTION
In October 2016, Elon Musk pitched a $2.6 billion merger with SolarCity to
Tesla’s shareholders.1 He described rising carbon dioxide levels, global
warming, and the inevitable transition to a world fueled only by sustainable
energy.2 He argued that together, Tesla and SolarCity would forge an “integrated
future” for the planet.3 The crowd cheered. Someone yelled “Save us, Elon!”4
What Musk failed to highlight in his fourteen-minute speech was SolarCity’s
dismal performance. The company’s debt had reached $3.4 billion, sales growth
had slowed, and it faced a liquidity crisis.5 Without the merger, the company
would have faced bankruptcy.6 Perhaps more importantly, Musk failed to
mention the pervasive conflicts of interest, both personal and financial, facing
Tesla management. Musk chaired both companies and was SolarCity’s largest
shareholder.7 Beyond these obvious conflicts, SolarCity was founded by Musk’s
two cousins, with substantial support and encouragement from Musk.8 Musk had
taken out millions of dollars in personal credit lines to buy more shares in the
company, and his aerospace company, SpaceX, had purchased $165 million in
bonds issued by SolarCity.9 Six of Tesla’s seven directors had close ties to
SolarCity.10
For all of these reasons, the market panned the merger. When news of Tesla’s
$2.6 billion offer was disclosed, Tesla’s stock dropped 10%.11 Jim Chanos, a
hedge fund manager that had shorted Tesla and SolarCity, called the acquisition
a “shameful example of corporate governance at its worst” and a “bailout” of
SolarCity.12 Auto industry experts said the idea of combining the electric-car

1
Austin Carr, The Real Story Behind Elon Musk’s $2.6 Billion Acquisition of SolarCity,
and What It Means for Tesla’s Future—Not to Mention the Planet’s, FAST COMPANY (June 7,
2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/40422076/the-real-story-behind-elon-musks-2-6-billio
n-acquisition-of-solarcity-and-what-it-means-for-teslas-future-not-to-mention-the-planets
[perma.cc/NL7U-MPJ3].
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Plaintiffs’ Answering Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second
Amended Complaint at 3, In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 12711-VCS (Del.
Ch. Mar. 28, 2018), 2017 WL 3316057.
7
Id. at 1-2.
8
Id. at 2.
9
Carr, supra note 1.
10
Id. (“Tesla’s board includes SolarCity’s former CFO, a SolarCity director, and two VCs
whose firms also have seats on SolarCity’s board, along with Musk’s brother, Kimbal.”).
11
Id.
12
Id.
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manufacturer with a solar energy company made no strategic sense.13 Many
highlighted existing problems at Tesla as further cause for concern—Tesla was
cash-strapped and struggling to meet production goals for its Model X. As
expressed in the Wall Street Journal, “Tesla latching on to SolarCity is the
equivalent of a shipwrecked man clinging to a piece of driftwood grabbing on
to another man without one.”14
Nonetheless, the merger was approved by a wide-margin—excluding the
votes of Musk and his affiliates, 85% of the company’s shareholders voted in
favor of the transaction.15 Accordingly, in litigation challenging the merger as
the product of pervasive conflicts of interest, lawyers for Tesla contended that
the transaction should receive business judgment protection.16 Tesla relied upon
Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings, LLC,17 which protects merger-andacquisition (“M&A”) transactions from judicial scrutiny when ratified by “the
fully informed, uncoerced vote of the disinterested stockholders.”18 Because
Tesla’s shareholders had voted in favor of the merger, the defendants argued
that the plaintiffs had no recourse.
The plaintiffs mounted a novel argument in response. The purportedly
“disinterested” Tesla shareholders included large institutional investors who
also owned SolarCity stock. The plaintiffs demonstrated that Tesla’s top twentyfive institutional investors—those holding 45.7% of Tesla’s stock—were
standing on both sides of the transaction.19 The plaintiffs claimed that this
rendered the institutional investors “interested” and the deal ineligible for
business judgment protection.20 Although the Delaware Court of Chancery

13

James B. Stewart, SolarCity and Tesla: Riding on Faith, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2016, at
B1 (noting that even if deal could lead to vertical integration “[t]hat approach has gone down
in automotive history as a colossal failure”).
14
Spencer Jakab, A Double Dose of Risk for Tesla in SolarCity Deal, WALL STREET J.
(Aug. 1, 2016, 11:59 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-double-dose-of-risk-for-tesla-insolarcity-deal-1470067165.
15
See Robert Ferris, Tesla and SolarCity Merger Gets Approval from Shareholders,
CNBC (Nov. 17, 2016, 2:59 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/17/solarcity-shareholdersvote-on-tesla-merger.html [https://perma.cc/TDY5-967M].
16
See In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 12711-VCS, 2018 WL 1560293, at
*36-37 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018).
17
125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015); see In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 2018 WL
1560293, at *1.
18
Corwin, 125 A.3d at 308. For discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes
70-84.
19
In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 2018 WL 1560293, at *26 n.183.
20
See id.
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never ruled on this claim, instead denying dismissal on other grounds,21 the court
venutred a prediction that the argument would one day resurface.22 We agree.
That is because institutional investors, mutual fund sponsors23 in particular,
increasingly control the outcome of corporate elections. Mutual funds have been
around for at least a century,24 but it was not until 1974 that they began to be a
force in governance.25 Having been steadily growing for decades, institutional
investors’ share of U.S. equity markets now stands at over 80%, with mutual
funds holding more than half of that amount.26 In the past decade, investor
demand for passively managed mutual funds—index funds and exchange-traded
funds (“ETFs”)27—has rendered the institutions that favor passive management
21
The Delaware Court of Chancery refused to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint on the
grounds that Musk qualified as a controlling shareholder of Tesla and that, therefore, Corwin
did not apply. Id. at *56-57. This was a somewhwat surprising outcome—Musk held only
22.1% of Tesla. Id. at *42. But despite his controlling less than a quarter of the company’s
votes, the Court of Chancery concluded there was enough evidence that Musk exerted “actual
domination and control over . . . the directors” to warrant the conclusion that Musk was a
controlling shareholder. Id. at *38, *56.
22
Id. at *32 n.183 (“This issue may resurface in the event Defendants renew their
ratification defense later in these proceedings.”).
23
Mutual funds tend to be externally managed by “sponsors,” which develop the funds
and hire portfolio managers to operate them. See WILLIAM A. BIRDTHISTLE, EMPIRE OF THE
FUND 45-50 (2016); John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why
Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 91 (2010).
24
The first mutual fund arrived in the United States in the 1890s, although the first modern
mutual fund was created in 1924. See The History of Mutual Funds, INV. FUNDS INST. CAN.,
https://www.ific.ca/en/articles/who-we-are-history-of-mutual-funds/
[https://perma.cc/LG5Z-FTZN] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019).
25
The passage of the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act (“ERISA”), which
requires pension funds to support any promised pension with a pool of segregated assets, was
a primary cause of the growth of mutual funds. See 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2)(A), (b)(1) (2012)
(setting forth minimum vesting requirements for defined-benefit plans); 29 U.S.C. § 1053
(2012) (same); id. § 1082 (providing for minimum funding standards). To comply with
ERISA, companies created retirement accounts that were invested in the capital markets,
usually mutual funds. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
863, 879-80 (2013).
26
Charles McGrath, 80% of Equity Market Cap Held By Insitutions, PENSIONS & INV.
(Apr. 25, 2017, 11:45 AM), https://www.pionline.com/article/20170425/INTERACTIVE/
170429926/80-of-equity-market-cap-held-by-institutions
[https://perma.cc/V44R-ERHJ].
Institutional ownership of U.S. corporations nearly doubled in the 1980s and 1990s, from 3050%, and by 2010 institutional investors held approximately 80% of publicly traded equities
in the United States. See Mutual Funds, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/topics/1441/
mutual-funds/ [https://perma.cc/6V6F-B6WP] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019).
27
Indexed mutual funds and ETFs now own over 10% of U.S. equities. John C. Coates
IV, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve 10 (Harv. Pub. Law
Working Paper No. 19-07, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=324
7337 (“Passive, indexed U.S. mutual funds and ETFs are now widely understood to hold more
than 10% of total U.S. equity markets.”). Professor Coates notes that the 10% figure likely
understates the extent of indexed investment in U.S. markets because institutions other than
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especially powerful: BlackRock now controls 5% blocks of more than half of
U.S. publicly traded companies, and Vanguard has 5% blocks in over 40% of
such companies.28 Moreover, the combined shares of BlackRock, State Street,
and Vanguard—the “Big Three”—exceed the stake of the largest shareholder of
40% of all U.S. listed companies, and roughly 88% of the S&P 500.29
Early observers celebrated the potential of sophisticated institutional
investors to use the levers of corporate governance—the power to vote, sell, and
sue—to improve corporate performance.30 Those hopes have been largely
dashed, and academics now warn of the implications of this concentration of
corporate ownership in the hands of institutional intermediaries in a number of
areas, including antitrust policy,31 corporate governance,32 and political
economy more broadly.33 In this Article, we focus upon the impact of mutual
fund ownership on shareholder voting.
Mutual fund voting is typically dictated by the fund’s “sponsors”—the firm
that assembles and markets the family of funds. A mutual fund is a pool of
investment securities that issue and sell redeemable common stock and is

registered mutual funds—e.g., pension funds, insurance companies, foreign funds, and
actively managed funds—also follow indexing strategies. Id. at 10-11.
28
Amy Deen Westbrook & David A. Westbrook, Unicorns, Guardians, and the
Concentration of the U.S. Equity Markets, 96 NEB. L. REV. 688, 732 (2018).
29
Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden Power of the Big
Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial
Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 313 (2017).
30
See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 817-20 (1992) [hereinafter Black, Agents Watching
Agents] (arguing for institutional shareholder oversight); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder
Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 575-91 (1990) [hereinafter Black, Shareholder
Passivity] (arguing that institutional shareholders could overcome collective action
problems); Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 865 (1991) (providing “a realistic
agenda for institutional investors” to improve corporate governance of portfolio companies);
Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 795, 799 (1993) (describing political conflicts of interest that impede activism
of public pension funds in corporate governance).
31
See generally Einer Elhauge, Essay, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267
(2016) (noting antitrust concerns that emerge when large shareholders own shares of
competing companies); Fiona Scott Morton & Herbert Hovenkamp, Horizontal Shareholding
and Antitrust Policy, 127 YALE L.J. 2026 (2018) (same).
32
See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of
Institutional Investors, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2017, at 89; Dorothy S. Lund, The Case
Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493 (2018) (describing agency problems
of passive funds and proposing restriction on voting by passive funds); Lucian Bebchuk &
Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and
Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3282794 (describing agency problems of passive funds and supporting evidence).
33
Coates IV, supra note 27, at 2-3 (arguing that “the rise of indexing presents a sharp,
general, political challenge to corporate law”).
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composed of a broad, diversified portfolio of debt, equity, or other
investments.34 The fund itself does not do much aside from house investor assets.
The sponsor manages the fund’s day-to-day operations. Most sponsors counsel
multiple funds35 and may specialize in funds of a certain type. As mentioned,
the Big Three specialize in passive management and hold the bulk of their
investor assets in passively managed funds.36 Others, including Fidelity and T.
Rowe Price, favor active management strategies and offer more actively
managed products than passive.37
Although it is widely acknowledged in the literature that intermediation
creates conflicts,38 there is, to our knowledge, no systemic account of the
paradigmatic types of conflict that arise when mutual fund intermediaries control
corporate voting rights. In this Article, we sort these conflicts into recurrent
patterns and provide a typology of three basic forms of conflicted institutional
voting. As the Tesla example shows, institutions may have interests on both
sides of a transaction or with industry competitors that may cause them to use
their vote to benefit their investment in another company (SolarCity) to the
detriment of the real parties in interest (Tesla shareholders). We call this “CrossOwnership Conflict.” The second conflict of interest we describe is even more
straightforward. Mutual fund sponsors often count company management as a
client for 401(k) accounts or other services. Such conflicts may cause the
sponsor to cast its votes in order to appease management—the client—even
when doing so is not in the investors’ best interest. We call this “Corporate
Client Conflict.” Finally, we describe the conflict that emerges from strict
adherence to a centralized, institution-wide voting policy, which many mutual
fund sponsors have adopted. Because the beneficial owners of funds rarely
overlap, uniform voting will often hurt some mutual fund investors and help
others.39 We call this “Uniform Policy Conflict.”
34
See John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund
Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1234-35 (2014).
35
For example, BlackRock offers investors the choice between nearly two hundred
different funds, including a variety of index funds, ETFs, target-date funds, and actively
managed funds. See All BlackRock Funds, MORNINGSTAR, http://quicktake.morningstar.com/
fundfamily/blackrock/0C000034YC/fund-list.aspx [https://perma.cc/PR9D-NX7A] (last
visited Apr. 1, 2019).
36
For simplicity, we characterize ETFs and index funds—funds that seek to track the
performance of a market index as cheaply as possible—as “passive funds.”
37
See Lund, supra note 32 at 517, 519 (noting Fidelity and T. Rowe Price had only 16%
and 8.9%, respectively, of each entity’s equity invested in passive funds).
38
See, e.g., Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 573 (2015)
(documenting agency costs of “intermediary influence” across financial markets). In two
articles, Professor Ann Lipton has documented many of the mutual fund voting conflicts that
we highlight. See generally Ann M. Lipton, Essay, Family Loyalty: Mutual Fund Voting and
Fiduciary Obligation, 19 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 175 (2017) [hereinafter Lipton,
Family Loyalty]; Ann M. Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, 44 J. CORP. L. 297 (2018)
[hereinafter Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court].
39
See generally Lipton, Family Loyalty, supra note 38.
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Our analysis of the conflicts institutional intermediaries face in voting has
important implications for investors, regulators, academics, and judges, but our
focus here is on corporate law. Recent Delaware jurisprudence establishes a
disinterested vote of shareholders as the pathway out of heightened judicial
scrutiny of mergers and acquisitions. The stated rationale for this shift is that
shareholders, the real party at interest, are better protected by the ballot box than
by the courtroom. In many cases, however, the votes that decide the outcome are
not exercised by investors with skin in the game but rather by conflicted
institutional intermediaries.
We argue therefore that Delaware courts should consider these conflicts
before counting the votes of institutional intermediaries as “disinterested.”
Specifically, if a plaintiff presents evidence of a disabling economic conflict—
either Cross-Ownership Conflict or Corporate Client Conflict—the institutional
investor, like conflicted management, should not qualify as disinterested. Such
conflicts undermine the rationale justifying the application of a deferential
standard of review—that the underlying investors have spoken in favor of the
transaction. Moreover, when there is a conflict, the court lacks assurance that
fiduciaries are necessarily voting to further their investors’ best interests. In
some cases, the conflicts may result in a vote that is aligned with investors’
interests, but not always. In cases where diversified shareholders favor a vote
for a value-reducing transaction, that conflict provides an additional reason for
enhanced scrutiny: the shareholders are not playing the gate-keeper role—
approving good transactions and vetoing the bad—that the court intended they
would play.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I analyzes how corporate law has
recently adopted shareholder voting as a substitute for enhanced scrutiny of
merger transactions. Part II assesses the governance and voting incentives of
mutual funds and provides a typology of the conflicts that may compromise
mutual fund voting. Part III offers implications of our analysis for corporate law.
Part IV closes with a brief summary and conclusion.
I.

DISINTERESTED SHAREHOLDER VOTING AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR
HEIGHTENED JUDICIAL SCRUTINY

Corporate law has identified shareholder voting as the route of retreat from
heightened judicial scrutiny of merger transactions. Emphasizing that voting
allows owners with a genuine economic stake to decide the fate of the
transaction, Delaware has largely retreated from judicial scrutiny in M&A cases,
instead of applying the deferential standard of the business judgment rule,
provided the shareholder vote in favor of the deal is informed and uncoerced.40
40

Under the business judgment rule, courts abstain from second-guessing and defer to the
business decisions of the board provided the decisions are not tainted by a conflict of interest,
in which case the business judgment rule does not apply. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The
Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 84 (2004) (arguing
that business judgment rule is a compromise between the board’s authority and the need to
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Because this structure can generally be pre-arranged by the transacting parties,
heightened judicial scrutiny has thus become a relic of the freewheeling 1980s.
Delaware invented heightened scrutiny to deal with recurring conflict of
interest problems in both controlling shareholder mergers, in which the
controller or an affiliate buys out the minority shareholders, as well as in thirdparty mergers, in which an unaffiliated third party buys the target company.41
The jurisprudential standards diverged—“entire fairness” for controlling
shareholder deals and “enhanced scrutiny” for third-party mergers—because the
underlying conflicts differ in severity.42 The conflict of interest in controlling
shareholder deals is direct and immediate because the controller’s interest in
paying as little as possible for the remainder of the company plainly conflicts
with the board’s duty to maximize the value of the company at sale.43 By
contrast, the conflict of interest in third-party mergers is more subtle, resting
instead upon the insight that when there is no controlling shareholder, target
boards might be more responsive to incumbent managers’ interests in retaining
their perquisites and positions than to shareholders’ interests in maximizing the
value of the company at sale.44 Recently, however, these two situations have
been reunified in Delaware jurisprudence by the substitution of an informed,
uncoerced shareholder vote in the former place of heightened judicial scrutiny.
A.

Controlling Shareholder Mergers and the Majority-of-the-Minority Vote

The reemergence of deference began, in the context of controlling shareholder
mergers, as a response to litigation patterns in controlling shareholder deals.
Because entire fairness was a fact-intensive standard of review, cases could not
be resolved at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stages.45 For
defendants, this meant being forced into discovery, the costs of which created a

hold boards accountable for their decisions); Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment:
A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 11-13 (2005)
(describing operation of business judgment rule).
41
These are also sometimes referred to as “squeeze-out” mergers.
42
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (applying tougher scrutiny in third party mergers); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701, 711-15 (Del. 1983) (requiring fair dealing and fair price in non-arm’s length
transactions).
43
See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993) (“Classic examples
of director self-interest in a business transaction involve either a director appearing on both
sides of a transaction or a director receiving a personal benefit from a transaction not received
by the shareholders generally.”).
44
See Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 457-60 (Del. Ch. 2011)
(describing range of situations to which enhanced scrutiny may apply); J. Travis Laster,
Revlon Is a Standard of Review: Why It’s True and What It Means, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 5, 11-18 (2013) (describing possible risks in third-party mergers).
45
See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) (“[P]olicy
rationale . . . mandates careful judicial scrutiny of a special committee’s real bargaining
power before shifting the burden of proof on the issue of entire fairness.”).
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strong incentive to settle.46 Controlling shareholder cases thus began to follow a
ritualized dance.47 Defendant boards, aware of the burden placed upon them by
the entire fairness standard, appointed a special negotiating committee in every
case.48 At the same time, well-advised controllers held back a portion of their
reservation price so that they could later raise their offer.49 The controller’s
negotiations with the special committee proceeded contemporaneously with the
settlement negotiations of any shareholder litigation.50 Both negotiations were
then brought to a close when the controller raised the price slightly, allowing
both the special committee and the shareholders’ lawyers to demonstrate their
value and, in the case of the lawyers, claim fees.51 Yet it remained unclear, in
spite of all this process, whether anything of substance had changed.

46
See In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 605 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(“[E]ach Lynch case has settlement value, not necessarily because of its merits but because it
cannot be dismissed.”).
47
Indeed, it was referred to by Delaware judges as a “minuet,” or alternatively, a “Kabuki
dance.” In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 945 (Del. Ch. 2010) (referring to
“the opening steps in the Cox Communications Kabuki dance”); In re Emerging Commc’ns,
Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *42 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004)
(referring to a “scripted minuet wherein [the Committee] would bargain for a negligible price
increase . . . [creating] a credible record of ‘arm’s length’ negotiations sufficient to survive
entire fairness review”).
48
See Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware
Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1803 (2004) (“[B]oards
of target companies in mergers involving conflicts of interest routinely appointed special
negotiating committees . . . composed of independent directors and charged those committees
with responsibility for negotiating the best possible terms on behalf of the company’s public
shareholders.”).
49
This could be for either of two reasons: (1) the special negotiating committee has real
negotiating power and uses it to extract price concessions from the buyer; or more cynically
(2) both sides understand that in order to minimize liability risk, the special litigation
committee must be seen to be “effective,” for which the increase in price can be offered as
evidence. If the latter explanation is correct, of course, the controller may merely hold back a
portion of its ultimate price in the initial offer, such that the price concession extracted by the
special committee is in fact illusory.
50
The rough contemporaneity is possible because controlling shareholder transactions are
often public before the merger agreement is signed. Because these transactions must be
approved by a special committee, they are typically announced as proposals when the special
committee is formed, thus allowing shareholder plaintiffs to challenge the proposal and
thereby become a part of the negotiation with the special committee. See In re Cox Commc’ns,
879 A.2d at 620 (“Instead of suing once a controller actually signs up a merger agreement
with a special committee of independent directors, plaintiffs sue as soon as there is a public
announcement of the controller’s intention to propose a merger.”).
51
See id. at 621 (“[T]he artistry of defense counsel is to bring the first and second tracks
to the same destination at the same time. . . . When [the final] price is known but before there
is a definitive deal, defense counsel . . . makes its ‘final and best offer’ to plaintiffs’ counsel.
The plaintiffs’ counsel then accepts . . . .”).

2019]

CONFLICTED MUTUAL FUND VOTING

1161

To address this dynamic, the Delaware Court of Chancery began to
experiment, first in short-form then in long-form mergers,52 with allowing the
combination of both special committee approval and a majority of the minority
shareholder vote, to shift the burden of proof and, eventually, the standard of
review.53 The shareholder vote was the critical addition here.54 The Delaware
Supreme Court ultimately adopted the committee and vote structure as a
substitute for heightened scrutiny in Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp.55
M & F Worldwide Corp. was a standard controlling shareholder case, but the
controller had adopted the committee-plus-vote structure from the beginning,
conditioning the transaction on approval both of a special committee of
independent directors and a majority vote of the minority shareholders.56
Accordingly, the Court of Chancery dismissed the inevitable shareholder suit on
the basis of the procedural protections,57 underscoring the increasing role of
institutional investors in deferring to the shareholder vote under the business
judgment rule.58 After the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the Court of
52
The principal distinction between a long-form merger under Delaware law section 251,
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2019), and a short-form merger under section 253, id. § 253,
is whether a shareholder vote is required to consummate the transaction.
53
See In re Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 607 (advocating, in dicta, “unified” standard for
both long- and short-form mergers provided both procedural protections are met); In re
Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 19,
2001) (applying business judgment rule rather than entire fairness to section 253 merger part
of two-step transaction with other procedural protections, including special committee and
majority of minority condition); see also In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397,
400 (Del. Ch. 2010) (applying entire fairness review because special committee did not
recommend in favor of tender offer); In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S’holder Litig., No.
758-CC, 2009 WL 3165613, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009) (applying entire fairness review
rather than business judgment rule because of inadqeuate shareholder protections).
54
Under the statute, short-form mergers required no shareholder vote at all, and long-form
mergers did not require the separate approval of a majority of the shares not voted by the
controller. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251, 253.
55
88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014).
56
In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 506 (Del. Ch. 2013) (describing structure of
transaction).
57
The Delaware Court of Chancery expressly stated the structural requirements necessary
to shift the standard of review: the “negotiation and approval by a special committee of
independent directors fully empowered to say no” and “approval by an uncoerced, fully
informed vote of a majority of the minority investors.” Id. at 502.
58
The Court of Chancery emphasized:
[A] generation ago, our Supreme Court noted the prevalence of institutional investors in
the target company’s stockholder base in concluding that a proxy contest centering on
the price of a takeover offer was viable, . . . stating that “[i]nstitutions are more likely
than other shareholders to vote at all [and] more likely to vote against manager
proposals.” Market developments in the score of years since have made it far easier, not
harder, for stockholders to protect themselves. . . . Not only that, institutional investor
holdings have only grown since 1994, making it easier for a blocking position of minority
investors to be assembled.
Id. at 530-31 (footnote omitted).
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Chancery’s holding on appeal,59 it became clear that the doorway out of entire
fairness is a transaction structure that provides for both a special negotiating
committee and a majority of minority vote.60
B.

Third-Party Mergers and the Cleansing Vote

The reemergence of deference in third-party mergers likewise came about as
a response to settlement pathologies. The pattern in third-party merger cases was
for shareholder plaintiffs to file complaints alleging defects in the merger
process and the merger price and then to amend their claims, once the
preliminary proxy statement was released, to allege inadequacies in the
disclosures about the deal.61 The shareholder plaintiffs would seek equitable
relief—an injunction barring consummation of the transaction—and, in the
meantime, expedited discovery. Because the Delaware standard—a “colorable
claim and . . . a possibility of . . . irreparable injury”62—entitled plaintiffs to
expedited discovery in essentially every case challenging the adequacy of
merger disclosures,63 which is to say every third-party merger case, defendants
once again sought settlement to avoid the looming cost of discovery.64 The vast
59

M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d at 654.
See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and the
Court’s Ruling at 66, Swomley v. Schlecht, No. 9355-VCL (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2014), 2014
WL 4470947 (granting motion to dismiss on the basis of procedural protections and noting
that “the whole point of encouraging [the M & F Worldwide] structure was to create a situation
where defendants could effectively structure a transaction so that they could obtain a pleadingstage dismissal against breach of fiduciary duty claims”).
61
Delaware courts derived fiduciary duties to disclose from the statutory command that
mergers be put to a shareholder vote, which is an illusory right if the board does not also
provide adequate disclosure. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2019) (requiring shareholder
vote on mergers); Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992) (implying disclosure duties
from mandatory shareholder vote); see Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob:
The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1096 (1996)
(describing development of duty of disclosure under Delaware corporation law).
62
Giammargo v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 13845, 1994 WL 672698, at *2 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 15, 1994).
63
Shareholders can always argue that they will be irreparably injured by the failure to
disclose material information prior to the shareholder vote. See In re BioClinica, Inc. S’holder
Litig., No. 8272-VCG, 2013 WL 5631233, at *4 n.46 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2013) (“The standard
for a motion to expedite is ‘colorability’ and the standard for a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) is ‘reasonable conceivability’–in my view, a higher, although still minimal, pleading
burden.”); see also Sinchareonkul v. Fahnemann, No. 10543-VCL, 2015 WL 292314, at *1
n.1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2015) (“[T]he standard for expedition, colorability, which simply
implies a non-frivolous set of issues, is even lower than the ‘conceivability’ standard applied
on a motion to dismiss.” (quoting In re BioClinica Inc., S’holder Litig., 2013 WL 5631233,
at *1 n.1)).
64
See Sean J. Griffith & Anthony A. Rickey, Objections to Disclosure Settlements: A
“How To” Guide, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 281, 290 (2017) (describing importance of discovery in
motivating settlements and describing process whereby settling parties engage in desultory
confirmatory discovery rather than serious adversarial discovery).
60
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majority of such settlements involved no monetary relief for the shareholder
class but only the addition of a small number of supplemental disclosures in the
merger proxy.65 Nevertheless, the corporate benefit doctrine was invoked to
allow plaintiffs’ counsel to recover fees from the company, often in the $350,000
to $700,000 range.66
The ease of achieving disclosure settlements and attorneys’ fees served only
to encourage further claims. By 2009, shareholder claims were brought against
close to 90% of all third-party mergers, a number that held until 2016.67
Delaware was widely criticized as a haven for wasteful litigation.68 In response,
the judiciary attempted to address the problem in a number of ways, generally
unsuccessfully.69 Then, in 2015, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Corwin.70
In Corwin, the Supreme Court affirmed an opinion of the Court of Chancery
dismissing a post-closing damages claim against a third-party merger.71 The
basis for the conclusion was the shareholder vote in favor of the merger, which
had the effect of cancelling enhanced scrutiny, in favor of business judgment
rule review. According to the court, an “uncoerced, informed stockholder vote
is outcome-determinative, even if Revlon applied to the merger.”72 Implicitly
following the logic of M & F Worldwide, Corwin substitutes the “cleansing

65
Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the Peppercorn
Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX.
L. REV. 557, 559 (2015).
66
See Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 13-16 (2015)
(describing application of corporate benefit doctrine to third-party mergers).
67
Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2015, at 2 (Jan.
14, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2715890 (providing empirical
evidence of litigation activity and outcomes).
68
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Fee-Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted Wound, 40
DEL. J. CORP. L. 851, 852 (2016) (contending that merger litigation is a “problem that has
reached crisis proportions”).
69
For example, in Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, the Delaware Supreme Court reduced
the stringency of enhanced scrutiny. 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009); see Lyman Johnson &
Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 180-93 (2014)
(documenting declining stringency of Revlon scrutiny). However, as long as plaintiffs could
still use it to seek injunctive relief, Revlon continued to generate nonmeritorious claims.
Likewise, in ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, the Delaware Supreme Court
suggested that fee-shifting bylaws might be introduced to deter nonmeritorious litigation. 91
A.3d 554, 560 (Del. 2014). However, the legislature quickly reversed the judiciary on feeshifting. See Dan Awrey, Blanaid Clarke & Sean J. Griffith, Resolving the Crisis in U.S.
Merger Regulation: A Transatlantic Alternative to the Perpetual Litigation Machine, 35 YALE
J. ON REG. 1, 59-62 (2018) (proposing regulation as alternative to private litigation as means
of protecting shareholders in mergers).
70
Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings, LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 314 (Del. 2015).
71
Id. at 306. Although much of the dispute in the Court of Chancery was over whether the
buyer should be treated as a controlling shareholder, the case was decided as if it were a thirdparty merger. Id. at 306-08.
72
Id. at 308.
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effect” of a shareholder vote for rigorous judicial scrutiny.73 This logic has since
been extended to two-step tender offer mergers as well.74
Because it speaks only to damages claims—a class of cases that received
enhanced scrutiny only grudgingly, if at all75—Corwin may not seem like a
major shift.76 However, the impact of Corwin becomes clear when it is paired
with the Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling one year earlier in C & J Energy
Services, Inc. v. City of Miami General Employees’ & Sanitation Employees’
Retirement Trust,77 holding that injunctions should generally not be issued
where there is no alternative bidder.78 C & J follows longstanding Delaware
practice in not enjoining transactions if doing so risks leaving shareholders with
no deal at all,79 but its practical effect is that there is no meaningful prospect of
an injunction in most cases. Paired with Corwin, C & J creates something of a
Catch-22. Corwin says enhanced scrutiny is now generally unavailable for
damages, leaving only injunction cases. And C & J says enhanced scrutiny is
now generally unavailable for injunctions, leaving only damages cases. Read
together, the clear message is that enhanced scrutiny is now generally
unavailable. The sole constraint is now the shareholder vote.
The irony is that Corwin is not the decision that ended the filing of the easymoney disclosure cases that had drawn Delaware into disrepute. Those practices
73
According to Professor Charles Korsmo, “Corwin follows directly from [M & F
Worldwide]. Once you hold that the procedural trappings of an arm’s-length deal entitle a
majority stockholder squeeze-out to business judgment rule deference, it would be strange
indeed to deny such deference to an actual arm’s-length deal.” Charles R. Korsmo,
Delaware’s Retreat from Judicial Scrutiny of Mergers 5 (Jan. 3, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author); see also J. Travis Laster, The Effect of Stockholder Approval
on Enhanced Scrutiny, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1443, 1443 (2014) (arguing that only in
absence of independent, disinterested, and sufficiently informed decision makers will the
court apply stringent review). Professor Korsmo also notes, however, that this logic can be
reversed. Rather than taking M & F Worldwide to its logical conclusion in Corwin, Revlon
could be read as a correction to M & F Worldwide, suggesting that the right standard of review
in controlling shareholder cases with procedural protections might be enhanced scrutiny rather
than business judgment. See Korsmo, supra, at 19, n.101.
74
In re Volcano Corp. S’holder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 738 (Del. Ch. 2016) (applying
business judgment review where “disinterested, uncoerced, fully informed stockholders
tendered a majority of [target company’s] outstanding shares into the Tender Offer”).
75
Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009), is an example. See supra text
accompanying note 69.
76
Corwin, 125 A.3d at 312 (arguing that enhanced scrutiny was designed for injunctions,
not damages).
77
107 A.3d 1049 (Del. 2014).
78
Id. at 1053.
79
Delaware courts have consistently demonstrated a reluctance to enjoin a transaction in
the absence of a competing bidder. See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432,
439 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“Although a reasonable mind might debate the tactical choices made by
the El Paso Board, these choices would provide little basis for enjoining a third-party merger
approved by a board overwhelmingly comprised of independent directors, many of whom
have substantial industry experience.”).
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were brought to an end by the Court of Chancery’s 2016 holding in In re Trulia,
Inc. Stockholder Litigation80 that disclosure settlements provided no
compensable benefit unless the supplemental disclosures corrected “a plainly
material misrepresentation or omission.”81 Trulia changed litigation and
settlement patterns in Delaware and across the nation, as nonmeritorious merger
claimants fled Delaware in search of more hospitable standards in alternative
state and federal courts.82 Moreover, Trulia addressed the settlement pathologies
of third-party merger cases without fundamentally altering substantive law. But
by the time the Court of Chancery ruled on Trulia, Corwin had already been
decided. And Corwin, in substituting the shareholder vote for judicial scrutiny,
fundamentally altered substantive law.

80

129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016).
Id. at 898 (emphasizing further that “it should not be a close call that the supplemental
information is material as that term is defined under Delaware law”). Prior to the articulation
of this standard in Trulia, numerous Court of Chancery decisions had rejected proferred
settlements for providing no meaningful benefit to the shareholder class. See In re Aruba
Networks, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 10765-VCL, slip op. at 73 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2015)
(denying settlement approval and emphasizing that representation is inadequate where
counsel files litigation when “there wasn’t a basis to file in the first place” but subsequently
fails to aggressively litigate when discovery turns up valuable information); Acevedo v.
Aeroflex Holding Corp., No. 9730-VCL, slip op. at 73 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2015) (rejecting
disclosure-only settlement where plaintiffs settled for “precisely the type of nonsubstantive
disclosures that routinely show up in these types of settlements”); In re Theragenics Corp.
Stockholders Litig., No. 8790-VCL, slip op. at 69 (Del. Ch. May 5, 2014) (refusing to approve
settlement and noting that “when a fiduciary action settles, I have to have some confidence
that the issues in the case were adequately explored, particularly when there is going to be a
global, expansive, all-encompassing release given”); Rubin v. Obagi Med. Prods., Inc., No.
8433-VCL, slip op. at 20-21 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2014) (refusing to approve settlement and
noting that “the type of global release that plaintiff’s counsel gives in this case and routinely
gives in return for disclosure settlements provides expansive protection for the defendants
against a broad range of claims, virtually all of which have been completely unexplored by
the plaintiffs”); In re Medicis Pharm. Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 7857-CS, slip op. at 24 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 26, 2014) (refusing to approve settlement because “giving out releases lightly . . . is
something we’ve got to be careful about”); In re Transatlantic Holdings Inc. S’holders Litig.,
No. 6574-CS (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2013) (refusing to approve settlement for lack of “any real
investigation,” disclosure of additional background information, and in light of the
overwhelming vote in favor of the transaction); see also In re Riverbed Tech., Inc.
Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 241, at *20 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17,
2015) (approving settlement but noting that “[i]f it were not for the reasonable reliance of the
parties on formerly settled practice in this Court . . . the interests of the Class might merit
rejection of a settlement encompassing a release that goes far beyond the claims asserted and
the results achieved”).
82
Disclosure claims were driven out of the state, often brought instead in federal court
under federal law. See Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay Provisions
Can Fix the Deal Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT
IN CHANGING TIMES (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, eds., 2019) (detailing
flight of disclosure claims from Delaware to other jurisdictions).
81
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Comparative Competencies: Shareholders Versus Judges

The basic rationale underlying the shift away from heightened scrutiny in
M&A transactions is one of institutional competence. In theory at least, voting
allows owners with a genuine economic stake to decide the fate of the
transaction. Judges, loathe to act as “super-directors” by substituting their
judgment for that of the board and the shareholders, are therefore happy to defer
to the outcome of a fair—that is, uncoerced and fully informed—vote.83 The
Corwin court provided a clear articulation of this rationale:
[T]he long-standing policy of our law has been to avoid the uncertainties
and costs of judicial second-guessing when the disinterested stockholders
have had the free and informed chance to decide on the economic merits of
a transaction for themselves. There are sound reasons for this policy. When
the real parties in interest—the disinterested equity owners—can easily
protect themselves at the ballot box by simply voting no, the utility of a
litigation-intrusive standard of review promises more costs to stockholders
in the form of litigation rents and inhibitions on risk-taking than it promises
in terms of benefits to them. The reason for that is tied to the core rationale
of the business judgment rule, which is that judges are poorly positioned to
evaluate the wisdom of business decisions and there is little utility to
having them second-guess the determination of impartial decision-makers
with more information (in the case of directors) or an actual economic stake
in the outcome (in the case of informed, disinterested stockholders). In
circumstances, therefore, where the stockholders have had the voluntary
choice to accept or reject a transaction, the business judgment rule standard
of review is the presumptively correct one and best facilitates wealth
creation through the corporate form.84
This institutional competence rationale has deep roots in Delaware corporate
law. Many Delaware decisions expressly recognize informed, disinterested
shareholders as capable of deciding their own fate.85 Furthermore, many
83

Delaware courts have long resisted the “super-director” mantle. See Brehm v. Eisner,
746 A.2d 244, 266 (Del. 2000) (“To rule otherwise would invite courts to become superdirectors, measuring matters of degree in business decisionmaking and executive
compensation.”); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 10389, 1989 WL 7036, at *14
n.13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (“To recognize in courts a residual power to review the substance
of business decisions for ‘fairness’ or ‘reasonableness’ or ‘rationality’ where those decisions
are made by truly disinterested directors in good faith and with appropriate care is to make of
courts super-directors.”).
84
Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312-14 (Del. 2015) (footnotes
omitted).
85
See In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 114-15 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“When
disinterested stockholders make a mature decision about their economic self-interest, judicial
second-guessing is almost completely circumscribed by the doctrine of ratification.”); In re
Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 207 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(“[D]octrines . . . operate to keep the judiciary from second-guessing transactions when
disinterested stockholders have had a fair opportunity to protect themselves by voting no.”);
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Delaware decisions suggest that the basis for deference is enhanced when the
shareholder base contains sophisticated institutional investors.86 An opinion of
the Court of Chancery notes that deference is especially appropriate when a
corporate “electorate is dominated by sophisticated institutional investors wellpositioned to vote in an informed manner . . . assuming adequate disclosures.”87
Delaware’s willingness to defer to the shareholder vote, especially when the
shareholder base contains sophisticated institutional investors, follows corporate
law scholarship’s emphasis on the importance of sophisticated institutional
investors.88 Members of the judiciary, in their extrajudicial writings, have also
emphasized the role of institutional investors in forcing managers to remain
accountable to shareholders.89 In a recent contribution to an edited volume, Vice
Chancellor Laster emphasized “the rise of sophisticated institutional investors
who have the ability to influence the direction of the corporations in which they
In re PNB Holding Co. S’holders Litig., No. 28-N, 2006 WL 2403999, at *15 (Del. Ch. Aug.
18, 2006) (“[W]hen most of the affected minority affirmatively approves the transaction, their
self-interested decision to approve is sufficient proof of fairness to obviate a judicial
examination of that question.”); Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 901 (Del.
Ch. 1999) (“In this day and age in which investors also have access to an abundance of
information about corporate transactions from sources other than boards of directors, it seems
presumptuous and paternalistic to assume that the court knows better in a particular instance
than a fully informed corporate electorate with real money riding on the corporation’s
performance.”).
86
See In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 619 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(“[W]ith increasingly active institutional investors and easier information flows, stockholders
have never been better positioned to make a judgment as to whether a special committee has
done its job.”); In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 444 (Del. Ch. 2002)
(“Adherence to the Solomon rubric as a general matter, moreover, is advisable in view of the
increased activism of institutional investors and the greater information flows available to
them.”).
87
In re Staples, Inc. S’holders Litig., 792 A.2d 934, 952 (Del. Ch. 2001) (noting that in
such cases “this court has been rightly reluctant to interpose its own view of the business
merits, thereby precluding an opportunity for the genuine stakeholders to make their own
decision”).
88
See John Armour, Jack B. Jacobs & Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Evolution of Hostile
Takeover Regimes in Developed and Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework, HARV.
INT’L L.J., Winter 2011, at 219, 222 (emphasizing presence of sophisticated institutional
investors as distinguishing characteristic of takeover regimes); Marcel Kahan & Edward
Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1001 (2010) (emphasizing role of sophisticated
institutional investors in putting pressure on incumbent managers).
89
Jack B. Jacobs, Lecture, Does the New Corporate Shareholder Profile Call for a New
Corporate Law Paradigm?, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19, 31 (2012) (noting that “the
new shareholder profile [consisting of concentrated ownership by sophisticated institutional
investors] is an irrefutable reality that justifies inquiring into whether courts should take that
into account in formulating and applying fiduciary duty principles”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., One
Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for
the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS.
LAW. 1, 14 (2010) (“The potency of the institutional investor community is easy to see. When
they want something, they tend to get it.”).
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invest” as one of two “predominant influences” in the evolution of Delaware
corporate law over the last thirty years.90 According to Laster, “Recognizing that
stockholders are empowered and capable of making their own decisions changes
the role of the judiciary . . . . [W]hen stockholders can protect themselves, they
do not need judges. Only when the voting process itself is undermined does a
role for the judge remain.”91 Revisions to corporate law jurisprudence followed
this recognition: “[V]oting by sophisticated stockholders . . . emerged as an
alternative, market-based means of protecting against fiduciary overreaching.”92
However, the sine qua non of judicial deference to the vote is disinterest. The
excesses of controlling shareholders and unaccountable managers are only
constrained by disinterested shareholder voting. Interested votes count neither
in a majority of the minority vote under M & F Worldwide nor in a cleansing
vote under Corwin.93 But mutual fund sponsors have their own set of interests.
Moreover, as we explore in detail in Part II, below, these interests lead the voting
preferences of investment funds to conflict with those of their underlying
investors. This raises the question of how corporate law courts ought to construe
disinterest in light of the interests of institutional shareholders, a subject we
explore in Part III, below.
II.

MUTUAL FUND VOTING CONFLICTS

Mutual fund sponsors—especially the Big Three—are the key voices that
ultimately dictate the outcome of proxy contests,94 shareholder proposals,95 and

90

See J. Travis Laster, Changing Attitudes: The Stark Results of Thirty Years of Evolution
in Delaware M&A Litigation, in HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE LITIGATION 202, 203 (Sean
Griffith et al. eds., 2018) (describing other influence as “the system-wide failure of
stockholder-led M&A litigation to generate meaningful benefits for investors”).
91
Id. at 222-23.
92
Id. at 225.
93
Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 306 (Del. 2015) (listing shareholder
disinterest as element of vote); Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del.
2014) (constituting relevant minority shareholders as those, unlike controller, disinterested in
transaction).
94
See, e.g., Michael Blanding, Vanguard, Trian, and the Problem of “Passive” Index
Funds, HARV. BUS. SCH. WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Jan. 30, 2017), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/
passive-index-fund-leaders-push-for-shareholder-reforms [https://perma.cc/W4KN-Y8BW]
(“Trian, recognizing the growing power of index funds, tried to persuade three index investors
in DuPont—Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street—to support its management reform
package. All three funds refused to go along, although the assent of just one of them would
have tipped the balance in favor of Trian’s plan.”).
95
Steven Mufson, Financial Firms Lead Shareholder Rebellion Against ExxonMobil
Climate Change Policies, WASH. POST (May 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/energy-environment/wp/2017/05/31/exxonmobil-is-trying-to-fend-off-a-shareholderrebellion-over-climate-change/?utm_term=.f7e1c824faa7 (reporting that BlackRock and
Vanguard owned 13% of ExxonMobil and that their votes were pivotal in passage of
shareholder proposal seeking improved disclosure about effects of climate change).
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say on pay.96 Initially, observers theorized that these institutional investors—
because they often hold large, concentrated stakes in companies—could
overcome the rational apathy plaguing diversified shareholders and serve as
active participants in governance.97 But mutual funds largely disappointed in this
respect, especially when judged by shareholder proposals.98 At one point, their
dismal voting records prompted regulatory scrutiny, which lead to a Securities
and Exchange Comission (“SEC”) rule requiring mutual funds to disclose all of
their votes.99 The SEC also made clear that mutual fund advisors have a fiduciary
duty to vote investor proxies in the clients’ best interests.100 Fund sponsors have
essentially interpreted this duty as a requirement to vote all of their portfolio
company shares—an impressive feat that today requires a single sponsor to cast
hundreds of thousands of votes for thousands of portfolio companies annually.101
To manage this task, most mutual fund sponsors generally centralize their
voting and governance activities within a corporate governance team.102 These
teams are in charge of enacting the voting policy for the funds housed within the
institution, regardless of the investment strategy. In most cases, they also cast all
of the funds’ votes. These centralized corporate governance teams tend to be

96
Cf. Miguel Antón et al., Research: Index Funds Are Fueling Out-of-Whack CEO Pay
Packages, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 18, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/10/research-index-fundsare-fueling-out-of-whack-ceo-pay-packages (arguing that the Big Three may influence
executive pay packages).
97
See Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note 30, at 815 (exploring “potential
promise” of oversight by institutional investors); Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 30
at 575-91 (arguing “institutional shareholders could find it in their self-interest to take an
active interest in corporate governance”); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 30, at 865
(providing “realistic agenda for institutional investors” to improve corporate governance of
portfolio companies).
98
Gilson & Gordon, supra note 25, at 887 (noting “over the 2007 through 2009 proxy
seasons, mutual funds offered only seventeen (0.9%) shareholder proposals addressed to
corporate governance or performance issues”); Edward Rock, Institutional Investors in
Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE
363, 383 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-George Ringe eds., 2018) (explaining that institutional
investors suffer from misalignment of incentives that causes them to be relatively passive
when it comes to corporate governance).
99
Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered
Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564,
6565 (Feb. 7, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 249, 270, 274).
100
Id. at 6564.
101
See VANGUARD, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP ANNUAL REPORT 34 (2018),
https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/perspectives-and-commentary/2018_
investment_stewardship_annual_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DKX8-2HXQ] (noting that
Vanguard funds cast nearly 169,000 individual votes in 2018 proxy year and 170,000 in
2017).
102
This trend is relatively recent; a decade ago, most mutual funds relied on third party
proxy advisors to cast votes. Today, some continue to do so, delegating voting decisions to
proxy advisors such as Institutional Shareholder Servces (“ISS”) or Glass Lewis, although
most of the large sponsors have spoken out against this practice.
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small—as of January 2017, Vanguard employed twenty people charged with
engagement and voting at about 13,000 companies; BlackRock, about thirty-one
people for 14,000 companies; and State Street, eleven people for 9,000
companies.103 Accordingly, corporate governance groups rely on active fund
managers to provide information about portfolio companies in advance of a
vote.104 By contrast, index portfolio managers are not given a say in the voting
of their portfolio holdings.105
Most, but not all, corporate governance groups seek to achieve uniformity in
voting across funds.106 In 2017, Morningstar generated a report based on
interviews with corporate governance teams that included details about the
governance policies for different sponsors.107 For some, active fund managers
may give input before a vote, but they must ultimately follow the corporate
governance team’s recommendation even if they disagree. State Street and
Vanguard, for example, give their governance teams the ultimate authority on
final voting decisions.108 Tellingly, the funds explain that this is meant to ensure
“consistency and efficacy, as well as to minimize potential conflicts of interest
[which] arise when views of internal portfolio managers differ between each

103
See Sarah Krouse, David Benoit & Tom McGinty, Meet the New Corporate Power
Brokers: Passive Investors, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 24, 2016, 10:41 AM), https://www.ws
j.com/articles/the-new-corporate-power-brokers-passive-investors-1477320101. For updated
numbers, see Madison Marriage, BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street Bulk Up Governance
Staff, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/657b243c-e492-11e6-9645c9357a75844a.
104
See generally HORTENSE BIOY ET AL., MORNINGSTAR, PASSIVE FUND PROVIDERS TAKE
AN ACTIVE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP (Dec. 2017), https://www.morning
star.com/content/dam/marketing/shared/pdfs/Research/Morningstar-Passive-ActiveStewardship.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7QD-B7DV]. Invesco provides a unique example: its
voting platform allows active fund managers to debate in advance of a vote and that process
determines the voting position for the sponsor as a whole. BONNIE SAYNAY & HENNING STEIN,
INVESCO, PROXY VOTING: THE HALLMARK OF ACTIVE OWNERSHIP 8 (2017),
https://www.de.invesco.com/de/dam/jcr:3c5c700c-3a3c-4449-88fb-67679b937ff4/ESG_
White_paper_Proxy_voting_the_hallmark_of_active_ownership.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X49U-KAVC].
105
BIOY ET AL., supra note 104, at 14.
106
See Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Who Calls the Shots? How Mutual Funds
Vote on Director Elections, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 35, 48 (2013) (finding evidence that mutual
funds tend to economize by centralizing their voting decisions when it comes to director
elections); Angela Morgan et al., Mutual Funds as Monitors: Evidence from Mutual Fund
Voting, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 914, 921 (2011) (finding forty-nine of ninety-four mutual fund
families coordinate voting at family level, resulting in identical voting on 90% of proposals
on average, although some fund families have much higher levels of divergence in voting);
Burton Rothburg & Steven Lilien, Mutual Funds and Proxy Voting: New Evidence on
Corporate Governance, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 157, 162 (2006) (studying voting practices of
top ten mutual fund families and noting that all fund families but one voted their shares in
uniform block for each issue).
107
See generally BIOY ET AL., supra note 104.
108
Id. at 42, 46.
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other and with the stewardship team.”109 In other words, the mutual fund
sponsors acknowledge that there can be divergence in views between funds, and
yet the funds’ votes will be cast in a direction the governance team choses. If a
fund manager disagrees with the governance group’s voting recommendation,
the manager’s only recourse is to divest.110 As a result of this policy, both State
Street and Vanguard funds have impressive uniformity in voting; in 2015, only
195 out of 100,000 (or less than 2%) of proposals at State Street featured a fund
voting differently than its other funds; at Vanguard, only six per 100,000
(0.006%) proposals received differing votes.111
By contrast, some fund sponsors maintain a preference for consistency while
allowing divergent voting. At BlackRock, for example, the active fund managers
can depart from the house view if they disagree with it.112 Nonetheless, in 2015,
a BlackRock fund voted differently from all of the other funds in only eighteen
per 100,000 (or 0.018%) proposals.113 Similar to BlackRock, T. Rowe Price’s
fund managers have discretion to cast the funds’ votes differently than the
governance team recommends. However, the manager who chooses to do so
must document her reasons for departing from the governance team’s
recommendation.114 At the more extreme end of the spectrum is AIM/Invesco,
which, in addition to allowing its funds to vote differently from each other,
empowers them to promulgate and follow different voting policies.115
Fidelity is the sole mutual fund sponsor that delegates voting for its index
funds to a sub-advisor, Geode.116 As a result, Fidelity displays much higher
levels of disagreement in its proxy voting, with funds voting differently from
other funds in 3,144 per 100,000 (or 3.14%) of votes.117 But even at Fidelity, the
degree of centralization is high. And owing to their commitment to uniformity
in voting, mutual fund sponsors are able to leverage their heft in ways that are
often outcome determinative.

109

Id. at 14.
See id. at 42.
111
Fichtner, Heemskerk & Garcia-Bernardo, supra note 29, at 316-17.
112
BIOY ET AL., supra note 104, at 14 (“[A]t BlackRock, Amundi, and UBS, the policy is
for active fund managers to vote consistently across all funds, but they retain the authority to
vote differently from the house view.”)
113
Fichtner, Heemskerk & Garcia-Bernardo, supra note 29, at 317.
114
See Donna F. Anderson, T. Rowe Price’s Investment Philosophy on Shareholder
Activism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 18, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/18/t-rowe-prices-investment-philosophy-onshareholder-activism/ [https://perma.cc/9E98-9U39] (noting it is not uncommon for different
T. Rowe funds to cast different votes for the same proxy contest).
115
See Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds,
85 J. FIN. ECON. 552, 561 (2007) (noting AIM funds typically vote for certain policies while
Invesco funds typically vote against those same policies).
116
Id. at 560.
117
Fichtner, Heemskerk & Garcia-Bernardo, supra note 29, at 317.
110
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Mutual fund voting is subject to serious and recurring conflicts of interest
between the fund sponsor and its investors. As Professor Ann Lipton, who was
among the first to explore the conflicts between funds and sponsors, put it,
“Today’s conflicts . . . represent a pervasive, baseline characteristic of the
market, and they are growing.”118 In the Sections that follow, we provide a
typology of three such conflicts. The first, Cross-Ownership Conflict,
encompasses conflicts of interest that pit the institution against a company’s real
parties in interest. Broad diversification means that mutual funds are often empty
voters, with an incentive to cast a vote to benefit other investments. Second, we
explore Corporate Client Conflict, which encompasses conflicts of interest that
arise from the sponsor’s status as a profit-maximizing institution. Finally, we
note Uniform Policy Conflict—that is, intra-institutional conflicts of interest that
result when beneficial ownership differs across funds but sponsors nonetheless
adhere to a centralized voting strategy. In those situations, a course of action that
is likely in the best interest of one group of investors is unlikely to be wealthmaximizing for another.
A.

Cross-Ownership Conflict

Most U.S. publicly held corporations have a one-share, one-vote structure in
which voting power is proportional to a shareholder’s economic ownership in
the company. Economists contend that this structure promotes efficient
corporate decisionmaking because the shareholders with the largest financial
stakes in the company and, accordingly, the greatest incentive to maximize the
corporation’s wealth, will have the greatest influence.119 However, the rise of
institutional investing and broadly diversified shareholding complicates this
rationale: today, the largest corporate shareholders are widely diversified mutual
fund sponsors with interests elsewhere.
We are not the first to explore this problem. In their groundbreaking work,
Professors Henry Hu and Bernard Black demonstrated that hedge funds could
engage in “empty voting” through complex financial transactions that decouple
voting rights from economic interest.120 They showed that hedge funds can wield
substantial voting power while having limited, zero, or even negative economic
118
Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, supra note 38, at 118-19; see also Jill Fisch, Assaf
Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Passive Investors 2 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.,
Working Paper No. 414, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=319
2069 (“[T]he rise of passive investing has the potential to raise concerns about . . . conflicts
of interest . . . .”).
119
See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976)
(developing theory of optimal ownership structure of firms).
120
See generally Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting
and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006). Professors Frank Partnoy
and Shaun Martin were the first to identify the phenomenon of “encumbered shareholding,”
where shareholders use financial transactions to trade votes. See generally Shaun Martin &
Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775.
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ownership in the underlying company. In this latter situation, the empty voter
would have an incentive to vote in ways that reduce the company’s share
price.121
Despite the seriousness of these conflicts, the SEC has not yet acted to contain
them. This may be because the incidence of “empty” hedge fund activism is
relatively low, with the exception of a few prominent examples.122 By contrast,
the problem of mutual fund empty voting is likely to be much more pervasive
than hedge fund empty voting.123
Because mutual funds are highly diversified, they are very likely to stand on
two or more sides of an issue. And as they have grown in popularity, mutual
funds have not only grown their existing investments, but have also expanded
into new investment opportunities. This expansion has led to an increase in
significant cross-holdings.124 In 1985, “the five largest shareholders of any given
S&P 500 firm would hold 17% of that firm and 2% of another randomly selected
firm in the index.”125 By 2005, those numbers had risen to 26% and 10%.126 Put
differently, share ownership has become so concentrated that “in a hypothetical
conflict between two S&P 500 firms in 2005, 15% of the equity in either firm
would on average be held by institutional investors that prefer the other side to
win.”127 And as investor assets continue to pour into mutual funds, the incidence
of significant cross-holdings grows more likely every day.
Most mutual fund sponsors admit that their centralized voting strategy
requires them to aggregate all of their funds’ votes and cast them uniformly in

121
Hu & Black, supra note 120, at 815. The merger between Mylan Laboratories and King
Pharmaceuticals provides an example. When Mylan announced that it agreed to buy King at
a substantial premium, Mylan’s shares dropped sharply. The hedge fund Perry, which had a
substantial stake in King and wanted the deal to go through, then bought nearly 10% of Mylan,
becoming its largest shareholder. But Perry hedged the market risk associated with these
shares, meaning that its overall economic interest in Mylan was negative. Therefore, Perry
was incentivized to use its shares in Mylan to overpay for King. Id. at 816.
122
See KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP, PROXY VOTE PROCESSING ISSUES: OVER-VOTING
AND EMPTY VOTING 3 (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.kattenlaw.com/files/21384_Proxy-VoteProcessing-Issues.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9SH-JLNV] (“We are not aware of any information
tending to show that empty voting occurs with any frequency.”); Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard
Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 625, 652, 661-81 (2008) (listing worldwide examples of empty voting).
123
Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, supra note 38, at 118-19; Bernard S. Scharfman,
Mutual Fund Advisors’ “Empty Voting” Raises New Governance Issues, CLS BLUE SKY
BLOG (July 3, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/07/03/mutual-fund-advisorsempty-voting-raises-new-governance-issues [https://perma.cc/WY2B-3JJ4].
124
Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, supra note 38, at 310 (citing Jarrad Harford, Dirk
Jenter & Kai Li, Institutional Cross-Holdings and Their Effect on Acquisition Decisions, 99
J. FIN. ECON. 27, 36 (2011)).
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
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the way that is most likely to benefit the institution as a whole.128 In some cases,
that would require voting the shares of one company in order to benefit other
investments. The clearest examples involve M&A transactions, when mutual
funds stand on both sides of the transaction and there can be an obvious winner
and loser.129 Consider a stylized example: Company A management decides to
buy Company B, and the merger is viewed by the market as an excellent outcome
for Company B, which has been struggling to make interest payments on debt
and has had a number of setbacks in the past year. The market is less positive
about the prospect for Company A, which will assume many debts and liabilities
from Company B. Nonetheless, Company A shareholders overwhelmingly
approve the merger. They do not look back even when Company A’s share price
falls with the announcement of the deal.
What is going on here? Company A’s ten largest shareholders are
sophisticated institutional blockholders—why did they voluntarily agree to a
merger that clearly decreased the value of their investment? The answer may be
that most of the large institutional investors in Company A also hold large
investments in Company B and are therefore hedged.130 This means that their
incentives to oppose the deal may be dampened or even reversed depending on
the size of their investment in each company. Putting aside the question of
whether this is a good outcome for the institution’s investors, it is unlikely to be
in the best interest of the Company A shareholders, who now hold less valuable
stock.
This example is not merely hypothetical. Tesla’s acquisition of SolarCity, as
described in the introduction, is a prominent recent example. But there are
others. For example, in 2003, Bank of America’s plan to acquire FleetBoston
Financial was overwhelmingly approved by shareholders who stood on both
sides of the transaction, despite the fact that Bank of America’s market
capitalization decreased by $9 billion when the merger was announced; notably,
FleetBoston’s market capitalization increased by approximately the same
amount.131 The fact that Bank of America’s ten largest shareholders—all
institutional investors—alone lost more than $2 billion in the transaction did not
stop them from voting to approve it—most of those losses were neutralized or
even reversed because of their positions in FleetBoston.132 Professor Ann Lipton
has compiled a further series of deals in which overlapping ownership affected

128

See generally BIOY ET AL., supra note 104.
Cf. Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, supra note 38, at 298 (“The shifts are
particularly visible when it comes to mergers and acquisitions, where courts have long
recognized that directors face special conflicts not present in other kinds of transactions.”).
130
Id. at 311 (noting that when “investors stand on both sides of the deal, they are hedged;
any expenses paid by the acquirer benefit them in their capacity as a holder of target stock”).
131
Gregor Matvos & Michael Ostrovsky, Cross-Ownership, Returns, and Voting in
Mergers, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 391, 391 (2008).
132
Id. (noting that this example is “by no means an exception”).
129
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transaction dynamics.133 These include Jos. A. Bank’s 2014 acquisition of Men’s
Wearhouse134 and Anheuser-Busch InBev’s 2016 acquisition of SABMiller.135
Empirical evidence further indicates that institutional investor crossownership is a feature and not a bug of the modern M&A environment. An
analysis of M&A deals involving publicly traded companies during 1998-2004
revealed that in 41.7% of the deals, the acquiring and target firms shared some
of the same owners.136 Another study observed that, for the average merger, 18%
of the acquirer’s stock is held by target institutional owners and 21% of target
stock is held by acquirer institutional owners.137 And as assets continue to flood
into broadly diversified passively managed funds, the prevalence of crossownership will only grow.
Of course, the cross-holders who voted to approve these mergers may have
done so for a number of reasons, including that the deal was in the best interest
of both companies. But empirical evidence suggests that cross-holders are using
their voting power to approve value-destroying mergers. A 2008 study showed
that institutional investors with cross-holdings were more likely to vote for
mergers with negative announcement returns, while mutual fund owners without
cross-holdings tended to vote against them.138
In sum, there is ample evidence that cross-holdings affect a mutual fund
family’s voting on M&A decisions, but it is likely that these conflicts also affect
votes on other issues. As investors continue to flock to mutual funds, and
specifically passively managed mutual funds, it is increasingly likely that the

133

See Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, supra note 38, at 117-18.
Jos. A. Bank’s offer letter emphasized the overlap in the shareholder base as a source
of value for Men’s Wearhouse shareholders. See Alex Gavrish, Jos. A Bank and Men’s
Wearhouse Leave Investors Puzzled, VALUEWALK (Jan. 2, 2014, 10:09 AM),
http://www.valuewalk.com/2014/01/jos-bank-mens-wearhouse-leave-investors-puzzled/
[https://perma.cc/G8W7-KV7Q] (“The transaction can therefore provide unique benefits to
shareholders of Men’s Wearhouse, as they will receive a premium for their shares and at the
same time will remain shareholders of the merged entity by being also shareholders of Jos. A.
Bank Clothiers Inc . . . .”).
135
Shareholder approval was likely, financial advisors predicted, because many of Miller’s
largest shareholders held stakes in Anheuser-Busch. And indeed, in spite of opposition to the
deal coming from hedge funds with concentrated stakes in Miller, the deal was ultimately
approved thanks to the vote of the large institutional cross-holders. See Eyk Henning & Tripp
Mickle, Business News: Beer Deal Nears Reckoning—Hedge Funds May Hold Key to
Approval for AB InBev’s Takeover of SABMiller, WALL STREET J., Sept. 21, 2016, at B3.
136
See Maria Goranova, Ravi Dharwadkar & Pamela Brandes, Owners on Both Sides of
the Deal: Mergers and Acquisitions and Overlapping Institutional Ownership, 31 STRAT.
MGMT. J. 1114, 1115 (2010) (analyzing 2,688 M&A deals during between 1998 and 2004).
137
Chris Brooks, Zhong Chen & Yeqin Zeng, Institutional Cross-Ownership and
Corporate Strategy: The Case of Mergers and Acquisitions, 48 J. CORP. FIN. 187, 189 (2018)
(sampling 2,604 mergers between 1984 and 2014).
138
Matvos & Ostrovsky, supra note 131, at 391 (characterizing this as product of conflict
of interest). But see Harford, Jenter & Li, supra note 124, at 27 (finding that investors with
cross-holdings were not influential enough to impact most bids).
134
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pivotal voters will have significant conflicts of interest as a result of crossholdings.
B.

Corporate Client Conflict

Mutual fund sponsors experience another more nefarious conflict of interest
that often pits the institution against its own investors.139 Mutual fund sponsors
profit from fees charged to funds, which are calculated based on the fund’s assets
under management. Company management is a large source of 401(k) assets
invested in mutual funds, as well as an actual or potential client for other
services. For this reason, the fund sponsor has an incentive to cast investor
proxies in favor of management—the client—even when voting with
management is not in its investors’ best interests.140
As one example, consider BlackRock, one of the world’s largest asset
managers with over $6 trillion assets under management (“AUM”).141 As it has
grown in size, BlackRock has articulated a commitment to active involvement
in corporate governance, and while one of us has voiced skepticism about the
institution’s incentives and capacity to follow through on this promise,142
nobody can deny that BlackRock is extremely influential.143 In addition,

139
See Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 30, at 524-25 (“These conflicts . . . may
explain why many institutions vote promanager on proposals that are likely to reduce share
price.”); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1056 (2007) (noting that voting against
management can jeopardize 401(k) clients).
140
This conflict results in problems for investors in other contexts. See William A.
Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and Rewards in the Mutual Fund
Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1401 (2006) (explaining different forms of investment
management malfeasane as arising out of the fund adviser’s incentive to generate fees); Tamar
Frankel, Advisory Fees: Evolving Theories, INV. LAW., Feb. 2003, at 21, 21 (arguing that
fund’s aggressive sales team can increase profits more than good performance); John P.
Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: The Cost of Conflicts of Interest,
26 J. CORP. L. 609, 672 (2001) (arguing advisor fees are grossly inflated); Paul G. Mahoney,
Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2004, at 161, 162
(detailing alleged improper trading practices among funds resulting from conflicts of interest).
141
About Us, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/au/individual/about-blackrock
[https://perma.cc/7NC6-XEC7] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019). This is especially impressive when
you consider that U.S. mutual funds currently manage approximately $19 trillion in client
assets. Total Net Assets of US-Registered Mutual Funds Worldwide from 1998 to 2017 (in
Trillion U.S. Dollars), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/255518/mutual-fundassets-held-by-investment-companies-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/67T6-Q94A]
(last visited Apr. 1, 2019).
142
See Lund, supra note 32, at 511 (arguing passive funds have no financial incentive to
ensure portfolio companies are well run); see also Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, supra note 32, at
90 (arguing index funds have “especially poor incentives” to improve corporate governance).
143
See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, BlackRock’s Message: Contribute to Society, or Risk
Losing Our Support, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2018, at B1 (“Mr. Fink has the clout to make
[demands on companies]: His firm manages more than $6 trillion in investments through
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BlackRock is a public company, which means that unlike Fidelity and Vanguard,
it is required to file periodic reports with the SEC, making it easier to understand
the adviser’s business model.144
Here is what we know about BlackRock from its SEC filings. About 40% of
BlackRock’s AUM, or $2.4 trillion, come from corporate pension plans.145 Like
most large mutual fund sponsors, BlackRock offers its clients the choice
between active and passive management, but most of BlackRock’s invested
assets are in passively managed funds—BlackRock has about $1.6 trillion in
actively managed funds and $3.9 trillion in index funds and ETFs.146 BlackRock
profits from those funds as a result of the management fees it collects.
BlackRock typically calculates investment management fees as a percentage
of AUM, but active fund managers charge a substantially greater percentage of
AUM in fees. As a result of these higher fees, BlackRock’s smaller share of
active funds generates an equal amount of revenue as its passive funds—
approximately $1.3 billion each quarter.147 In total, these fees make up about
88% of BlackRock’s quarterly revenue.148
In the past few years, however, BlackRock, like all mutual fund sponsors, has
faced pressure to lower fees. This is in part because competition over fees has
become more intense; investors are increasingly selecting mutual funds on the
basis of fees, putting pressure on institutions to lower them.149 Fee competition
is particularly intense for passively managed mutual funds, which often
highlight their low fees to lure investors.150
As a result, BlackRock has focused on diversifying its revenue sources,
including by providing other services to corporations and other institutional
clients. For an annual fee, BlackRock offers a proprietary investment system
(“Aladdin”), as well as risk management, outsourcing, and advisory technology
systems to clients.151 Although these systems generate a mere $677 million
401(k) plans, exchange-traded funds and mutual funds, making it the largest investor in the
world, and he has an outsize influence on whether directors are voted on and off boards.”).
144
Note that by choosing BlackRock as an example, we do not suggest that it experiences
more severe conflicts than other mutual fund sponsors. These conflicts likely exist at all
institutional investors.
145
BLACKROCK, BLACKROCK 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2017), http://ir.blackrock.com/
Cache/1500109547.PDF [https://perma.cc/3P48-3YU3].
146
Chris Flood, BlackRock’s Rivers of Gold from Active Management, FIN. TIMES (Oct.
15, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/f62ed0c2-ada1-11e7-beba-5521c713abf4.
147
Id.
148
BLACKROCK, Q4 2017 EARNINGS: EARNING RELEASE SUPPLEMENT 6 (Jan. 12, 2018),
http://ir.blackrock.com/Cache/1001230788.PDF [https://perma.cc/7RBZ-2VBA].
149
Jason Zweig & Sarah Krouse, Fees on Mutual Funds and ETFs Tumble Toward Zero,
WALL STREET J., Jan. 27, 2016, at A1.
150
Fidelity has even taken the bold step of offering two index funds that charge no fees.
Justin Baer, Fidelity Eliminates Fees on Two New Index Funds, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 1,
2018, 5:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fidelity-index-fund-fees-tumble-to-zero1533141096 (describing reduction as method to exert pressure on low-cost rivals).
151
BLACKROCK, supra note 145, at 3.
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(about 5%) in annual revenue, BlackRock hopes that these systems will account
for 30% of the institution’s revenue in the next five years.152 BlackRock’s CEO,
Larry Fink, also views this business as an important part of BlackRock’s
competitive success. Indeed, in 2016, Aladdin’s revenues rose 13% while
BlackRock’s management fees in its investment business declined slightly.153
BlackRock is not unique in this respect—large mutual fund sponsors often
provide a range of client services, including brokerage, underwriting, insurance,
or banking services, to the company whose management is soliciting proxies.
In sum, like most large mutual fund sponsors, the bulk of BlackRock’s
revenue comes from corporate pension fund accounts. However, due to intense
competition and regulatory pressure,154 it is unlikely that BlackRock will be able
to increase fees—instead, it will have to bring in new assets or sell additional
services to clients to maintain its breakneck growth. And BlackRock, as well as
State Street and Vanguard, likely feel this pressure more than institutional
investors that primarily focus on active management.155 Investors choose those
institutions because of their passive investment vehicles, which are designed to
mimic indices and thus offer investors the same performance as rival passive
funds. That means that these institutional investors will have a difficult time
winning new clients on the basis of fund performance. An easier way to increase

152
See id. at 19 (“The sophisticated risk analytics that BlackRock provides via its
technology platform to support investment advisory and Aladdin clients are an important
element of BlackRock’s competitive success.”).
153
See id. at 45.
154
For example, in June 2016, the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and
Examinations announced that SEC examiners will scrutinize whether advisors have conflicts
of interest when making recommendations about share classes to their clients. OFFICE OF
COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, OCIE’S 2016 SHARE
CLASS INITIATIVE 1 (2016), https://www.sec.gov/ocie/announcement/ocie-risk-alert-2016share-class-initiative.pdf [https://perma.cc/YF23-R7Y7] (“[A]n investment advisor has failed
to uphold its fiduciary duty when it causes a client to purchase a more expensive share class
of a fund when a less expensive class of that fund is available.”).
155
We recognize that active fund managers also have an incentive to be deferential to
management, especially because access to management can help with discretionary trading
decisions. See Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Are Active Mutual Funds More Active Owners
than Index Funds?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/03/are-active-mutual-funds-more-active-ownersthan-index-funds/ [https://perma.cc/DE4S-JQ27] (arguing stewardship of index funds is
superior to that of active funds in part because of this conflict of interest). But in light of the
empirical evidence showing that the mutual fund sponsors that favor passive management
strategies vote with management most often, it is likely that the incentives to defer to
management are greater for passively managed funds. See Ryan Bubb & Emiliano Catan, The
Party Structure of Mutual Funds 3 (Apr. 16, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3124039 (noting that passively
managed funds, including those under Big Three families, support management at much
greater rates than other funds). Also, because most mutual fund voting decisions are
centralized, individual fund managers might not always be able to influence voting decisions
made for the institution as a whole. See id. at 29.
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assets under management (other than slashing fees and putting pressure on the
institution’s margins) is to develop and maintain close relationships with the
source of corporate 401(k) assets: management. These mutual fund sponsors
may also hope to convince management to utilize other services provided by the
sponsor.
These conflicts likely affect the institution’s voting—it is in the institution’s
best interest to side with management on important votes, even when voting
against management would be better for shareholders. Put simply, as Jack Bogle,
founder of Vanguard, explained in an SEC comment letter supporting a rule
requiring mutual fund vote disclosure: “Votes against management may
jeopardize the retention of clients of 401(k) and pension accounts.”156
The calculus is simple. Suppose a vote against management would be in the
shareholders’ best interest. Nonetheless, any gain to shareholders will benefit
the institution only indirectly. If taking an anti-management stance is expected
to increase the portfolio’s value by $1,000, the institution’s revenue will increase
by $5 if management fees are 0.5% of assets under management, and $6 if fees
are 0.6% (a more realistic number for passively managed funds).157 Furthermore,
the improved performance will not mean much to passive fund investors, all of
whom expect the fund to replicate the performance of the index anyway. Put
differently, it is highly uncertain whether a fund will attract new clients on the
basis of its pro-shareholder activism. However, if the institution’s activism is
likely to alienate management, it will put millions of dollars of client assets at
risk, potentially leading to large losses for the institution.158
There are a few prominent examples of Corporate Client Conflict affecting
mutual fund voting. For example, in 2004, after the SEC first required mutual
funds to disclose their votes, it came to light that a few large mutual fund
sponsors, including Fidelity, had voted against shareholder proposals to expense
employee stock options, which was viewed by many in the investment
community as a more honest accounting practice than the alternative.159
Immediately, the charge was levied that the management-friendly votes were the
result of a conflict of interest. The New York Times noted that Fidelity voted
against a shareholder proposal at Intel, where Fidelity served as the recordkeeper
for Intel 401(k) accounts worth $1 billion.160 In addition, a study of the stock
option expensing proposals found evidence that institutional investors with

156

See Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds,
85 J FIN. ECON. 552, 554 (2007) (quoting John C. Bogle, Mutual Fund Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2002, at A35).
157
See id. at 553.
158
See id.
159
Gretchen Morgensen, A Door Opens. The View Is Ugly., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2004,
§ 3, at 1.
160
Id.
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conflicts of interest were less likely to support the shareholder proposal than
institutional investors with no such conflicts.161
Recent empirical evidence also supports the hypothesis that mutual fund, and
in particular passive fund voting, is prone to conflicts of interest that result in a
pro-management stance. Professors Ryan Bubb and Emilio Catan have shown
that large mutual fund sponsors—including BlackRock, State Street, and
Vanguard—support management at greater rates than other institutions and
third-party proxy advisers Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) and Glass
Lewis.162 Additional evidence shows that these investors are especially unlikely
to oppose management on hot-button issues that directly affect management
teams; in 2017, for example, BlackRock voted for executive compensation
proposals at S&P 500 companies 98.3% of the time.163 Although 95% of sayon-pay proposals received shareholder support, BlackRock’s support for
executive pay packages exceeded even that high level.164 In addition, Professors
Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Tao Li, and James Pinnington studied proxy contests
spanning from 2008-2015 and found that large, passively managed mutual fund
sponsors are much more likely to support management in proxy contests.165
Bubb and Catan’s research also sheds light on the types of shareholder
proposals that these large mutual fund sponsors most often support—namely,
proposals to declassify the board and reduce supermajority voting
requirements.166 Nonetheless, they are less likely than other investors and thirdparty proxy advisors to support the dissident slate in a proxy contest.167 Why do
institutional investors favor proposals to make the electorate more accountable
when they so rarely use their increased voting power to challenge incumbent
directors? Perhaps institutional investors prefer structural arrangements that
make their votes more powerful because it renders their support more
meaningful to management. If BlackRock votes to support management when a
majority of shareholders is all that is needed to catalyze a different course of

161

Fabrizio Ferri, Tatiana Sandino & Garen Markarian, Stock Options Expensing:
Evidence from Shareholders’ Votes 1 (Oct. 17, 2005) (unpublished manuscript),
https://msbfile03.usc.edu/digitalmeasures/sandino/intellcont/Paper%206%20%20Voting%20for%20ESO%20expensing-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6D9-E5LX].
162
Bubb & Catan, supra note 155, at 3.
163
Gretchen Morgenson, Your Fund Has Your Stay, Like It or Not, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25,
2016, at BU1.
164
COMP. ADVISORY PARTNERS, SAY ON PAY VOTE RESULTS (S&P 500) 3 (2017),
https://www.capartners.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017-SoP_Update_5-15-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5H5H-RT4A].
165
Alon Brav et al., Picking Friends Before Picking (Proxy) Fights: How Mutual Fund
Voting Shapes Proxy Contests 3 (Columbia Bus. Sch., Research Paper No. 18-16, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3101473 (finding passive funds support
management up to 12% more often than active funds).
166
Bubb & Catan, supra note 155, at 3.
167
See id. at 20-22 (flagging high support for insurgents in proxy contests among active,
interventionist investors).
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action, management will be very grateful. Indeed, management is keenly aware
that maintaining good relations with their largest investors is an essential defense
to hedge fund activism.168 It is rational for large mutual fund sponsors to want
to foster the feeling of dependency.
Interestingly, Bubb and Catan also find that large mutual fund sponsors
support management proposals to merge or engage in large acquisitions more
often than other investors. For example, BlackRock supported such proposals
79% of the time; Fidelity, 70%; and Vanguard, 85%.169 By contrast, ISS
recommended approval in only 46% of cases; Glass Lewis, only 50%.170 CrossOwnership Conflict, discussed in the previous Section, could explain this
difference. It could also support the theory that mutual fund sponsors cater to
management—management is often heavily invested in the transaction it is
proposing, meaning that the cost of opposition may be substantial. And there is
at least one poignant example of a conflict of this type coloring a merger vote.
In 2002, Hewlett-Packard (“H-P”) founder and shareholder Walter Hewlett
challenged in the Delaware Court of Chancery the contentious merger between
H-P and Compaq, contending that H-P’s managers used corporate assets to
entice and coerce Deutsche Asset Management (a subsidiary of Deutsche Bank)
into switching its votes in favor of the merger.171 In the midst of an intense
campaign for votes, H-P management secured a multibillion dollar credit facility
to pay for merger costs and named Deutsche Bank as the co-arranger.172
Deutsche Asset Management had already cast twenty-five million votes against
the merger; days later, on the morning of the vote and after a thirty minute call
with H-P management, Deutsche Asset Management switched seventeen million
of its votes in favor of the deal. Shareholders ultimately approved the deal by a
narrow margin.173 Although the Court of Chancery ultimately granted summary
judgment for H-P on the grounds that the evidence did not establish the company
had engaged in improper vote buying,174 Deutsche Asset Management’s conflict
of interest was readily apparent.

168

See PWC, THE SWINGING PENDULUM: BOARD GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF
SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT 15 (2016), http://www.lexissecuritiesmosaic.com/gateway/
sec/speech/assets_pwc-2016-annual-corporate--directors--survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/LP9T
-C2SY] (finding half of corporations surveyed regularly communicated with their largest
shareholders to avoid shareholder activism).
169
Bubb & Catan, supra note 155, at 38.
170
Id. at 39.
171
Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. Civ.A. 19513-NC, 2002 WL 549137, at *1 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 8, 2002).
172
Id. at *2-3.
173
Id. at *1-3 (“[T]he margin between the votes in favor of and those against the merger
was less than 1% of the shares voted . . . .”).
174
See Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. CIV.A. 19513-NC, 2002 WL 818091, at *1516 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2002).
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Uniform Policy Conflict

When a mutual fund sponsor casts its portfolio shares uniformly, its corporate
governance group will have the most influence. This reality helps explain why
nearly all large mutual fund sponsors have a policy encouraging uniform voting,
and why some refuse to allow individual fund managers any discretion to depart
from it. But this preference for uniformity creates a new problem: the funds do
not have identical portfolios or investors, and thus centralized voting may benefit
one fund and its investors at the expense of others.175 We provide a few
illustrative examples in the Sections that follow.
1.

Favoring Active

Consider Institutional Investor, a large mutual fund sponsor that offers both
passive and active funds. Institutional Investor houses Fund A, an active fund
with a large position in TargetCo, and Fund P, an S&P 500 index fund that owns
shares in both TargetCo and BuyerCo. BuyerCo is larger and therefore Fund P
holds a bigger position in BuyerCo than it does in TargetCo.
The corporate governance team must decide whether to vote to approve a
merger between BuyerCo and TargetCo. To make this decision, they rely on
Fund A’s managers, who support the deal because it is predicted to benefit
TargetCo, which has been struggling. The Fund A managers lobby hard for the
institution to vote all of its shares in favor of the merger. However, because
BuyerCo will take on TargetCo’s struggling business, as well as its large debt
obligations, BuyerCo shareholders are less rosy about the merger. Nonetheless,
Institutional Investor votes all of its shares in favor of the merger. BuyerCo’s
share price drops after the vote is announced and Fund P investors’ portfolio
values decline accordingly.176
This example is unlikely to be rare or uncommon: most large institutional
corporate governance teams elicit information from their active fund managers,
while their passive fund managers remain completely uninvolved in corporate
governance.177 And although the result may be due to an asymmetry in
information flow, Institutional Investor’s corporate governance team has an
incentive to use its voting power to benefit its active funds, even at the expense
of its passive funds. That is because active funds charge higher fees and therefore
generate more revenue than passive funds.178 Additionally, active funds are
under extreme pressure to beat the market to justify their higher fees; by contrast,
investors do not expect anything more than market performance from index
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See Lipton, Family Loyalty, supra note 38, at 181-83.
These conflicts are likely to crop up elsewhere, too, but as discussed, they are the easiest
to observe in the merger context. There, the market often views transactions as benefitting
one group of shareholders more than another.
177
See BIOY ET AL., supra note 104, at 42, 46.
178
José-Miguel Gaspar, Massimo Massa & Pedro Matos, Favoritism in Mutual Fund
Families? Evidence on Strategic Cross-Fund Subsidization, 61 J. FIN. 73, 74 (2006).
176
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funds.179 Therefore, in the simple example above, Institutional Investor would
rationally use its voting power to maximize the value of active funds whenever
the interests between its active fund investors and passive fund investors
conflict. Such a strategy would improve the competitive position of its active
funds, drawing investors into high fee accounts,180 without seriously
compromising the position of its passive funds.181 Indeed, evidence exists that
mutual fund sponsors do exactly this—they coordinate their activities to enhance
the performance of the funds that are most valuable to the institution as a
whole.182
2.

Favoring Passive

A related scenario is also possible. Imagine that Institutional Investor has
many more dollars invested in passive funds than active funds. Institutional
Investor’s active Fund A has taken a long position in TargetCo. Fund P, like
most of the institution’s passive funds, has a larger position in BuyerCo than
TargetCo because of BuyerCo’s large size.
BuyerCo proposes to buy TargetCo in a deal that is viewed by the market as
value destroying for BuyerCo, but is expected to benefit TargetCo shareholders.
In this scenario, Fund A shareholders would want the deal to go through; Fund
P shareholders would not. If the corporate governance team evaluates the merger
by asking which course of action will benefit the greatest number of investors,
it will vote to approve the merger, even though Fund A shareholders will suffer
losses as a result.
Although this scenario seems less likely to occur than the first, it is consistent
with what the large institutional investors that favor passive management claim
to do: evaluate whether the deal will benefit the largest group of investors, and
then cast all of the institution’s votes in that direction.183 This approach may be
the welfare-maximizing for the sponsor, but some of the institution’s investors
will be left casting votes against their interests.
3.

Equity Funds with Different Investment Goals

The previous Sections discussed conflicts between active and passive funds,
but conflicts may also exist between different subsets of funds within each of
those categories. Vanguard alone offers 130 different mutual funds, including

179
See Edward Rock & Marcel Kahan, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let
Shareholders Be Shareholders 2 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Research, Paper No. 18-39, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3295098.
180
See Gaspar, Massa & Matos, supra note 178, at 74.
181
Id. at 101 (“[N]ew inflows to ‘high value’ funds will more than compensate any
outflows suffered by ‘low value’ funds.”).
182
See id. at 102.
183
See BIOY ET AL., supra note 104, at 25-47 (outlining voting strategies of various large
funds).
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those that specialize in growth, income, and value investment strategies.184 It
also offers target-date funds that span from a retirement date beginning in 2015
to 2065. Those portfolio managers should have different preferences for
governance; there is no way to adopt an institution-wide voting policy and then
vote all of the institution’s shares in lockstep without sacrificing the investment
objectives of some funds.
Consider differences between the governance preferences of a portfolio
manager at a growth fund, which targets companies with high growth prospects,
and an income fund, which seeks to generate an income stream for shareholders
in the form of dividends or interest payments. When asked to weigh in on a
shareholder activist who wants the company to increase dividend payments to
shareholders, the portfolio managers will have very different views. The
governance preferences of a portfolio manager at a growth fund should also
differ from those of a portfolio manager at a value fund, which seeks to invest
in stocks that the market undervalues. In particular, that value fund portfolio
manager should be less rosy about current management and perhaps more
interested in supporting shareholder activism than her growth fund rival.
Despite these different investment theses, there is often ownership overlap
across value, growth, and income funds.185 For example, 28% of the companies
appearing in the BlackRock’s iShares S&P 500 Value ETF also appear in its
iShares S&P 500 Growth ETF.186 Vanguard’s growth and value funds also
feature 5% overlap.187 Adherence to a centralized voting strategy for these
companies may not be in the best interests of all of the institution’s investors.
For target date funds that invest in individual stocks,188 a different conflict
emerges: their different time horizons may lead investment managers to have
differences in opinion when asked to weigh in on governance, the advisability
of shareholder activism, and M&A, among other issues. Quite obviously, a
target date fund with an end point that is close in time is less likely to take a

184
Vanguard Mutual Funds, VANGUARD, https://investor.vanguard.com/mutualfunds/list#/mutual-funds/asset-class/month-end-returns [https://perma.cc/9JTY-V893] (last
visited Apr. 1, 2019).
185
Rob Silverblatt, How to Avoid Portfolio Overlap, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 19,
2010, 10:49 AM), https://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/fund-observer/2010/05/19/howto-avoid-portfolio-overlap (noting portfolio overlap is common).
186
Ryan Vlastelica, A Major Value Fund Mirrors a Major Growth One More Than You
May Expect, MARKETWATCH (June 19, 2017, 5:37 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/
a-major-value-fund-mirrors-a-major-growth-one-more-than-you-may-expect-2017-06-19
[https://perma.cc/UCR3-AR3B]; see also Julie Clarenbach, Value? Growth? Both!, MOTLEY
FOOL (Jan. 2, 2009, 12:00 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2009/01/02/valuegrowth-both.aspx [https://perma.cc/V4YB-TYD2] (lauding diversified funds as key
investment strategy).
187
Vlastelica, supra note 186 (comparing overlap of various large funds).
188
Not all target date funds invest in stocks directly; some invest in other mutual funds
(and are accordingly referred to as “funds of funds”).
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long-term view. Nonetheless, when an institution votes its shares in lockstep to
advance a long-term perspective, those investors will sometimes be worse off.
4. Favoring Debt
Consider the same scenario as above: Institutional Investor is considering
whether to vote to approve a merger between BuyerCo and TargetCo, and the
market views the deal as good for TargetCo and terrible for BuyerCo. This time,
the institution’s active and passive funds are aligned; both have a larger
investment in TargetCo than they do in BuyerCo. But Fund D, a mezzanine debt
fund, has a large debt position in BuyerCo and is concerned that if the merger is
approved, BuyerCo will be in danger of defaulting on its debt, which would be
a disaster for the fund. Accordingly, Fund D’s portfolio manager vocally
opposes the deal and lobbies the corporate governance team to vote against it.189
Again, there is no way for Institutional Investor to vote its shares uniformly
without causing some of its investors to vote against their interests.
5. Favoring Vocal Investors
The next example involves conflicts between a vocal minority of investors
and an apathetic majority. Imagine that Institutional Investor is considering
whether to vote yes on a proposal to require Energy Company to disclose how
it plans to manage environmental and safety risks. Employees of the company
support additional disclosure, as they predict that it will lead to better working
conditions. Management opposes the proposal, contending that it represents an
incursion into their authority to manage the business and affairs of the company,
will take time and money to put together the report, and is distracting to
management at best and harmful to the company’s competitiveness at worst.
Institutional Investor believes that the majority of its shareholders are or would
be opposed to the proposal. But a large and vocal investor, Public Pension Fund,
is strongly in favor. Institutional Investor knows that Public Pension Fund would
be likely to take its large portfolio elsewhere if the proposal fails; Pubic Pension
Fund’s board of governors are up for election this year and they are facing
pressure to deliver results that indicate that their stewardship is benefitting
employees. Institutional Investor will have an incentive to vote yes for the
proposal, even if the majority of its investors opposes it, because the rational
apathy of the dispersed investors is no match for the extreme preference of a
client with a large portfolio.190

189

Professors William Birdthistle and Todd Henderson have explored these conflicts in
the context of private equity. See generally William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson,
One Hat Too Many? Investment Desegregation in Private Equity, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 45
(2009) (discussing conflicts of interest arising from investing in both private equity and public
debt).
190
By way of example, CalPERS, the California public pension fund, uses a set of
environmental, social, and governance criteria to evaluate investments and push companies
to adopt certain progressive policies. Though some groups have attacked this strategy, others,

1186

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:1151

6. Favoring Something Else?
This last Section explores other considerations that may color the voting of
large mutual fund sponsors. Recently, the view that companies should singlehandedly focus on shareholder wealth maximization has been challenged from
many directions. Perhaps most prominently, Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock,
has written: “To prosper over time, every company must not only deliver
financial performance, but also show how it makes a positive contribution to
society. Companies must benefit all of their stakeholders, including
shareholders, employees, customers, and the communities in which they
operate.”191 Even more controversially, Fink announced that BlackRock, as one
of the largest and most influential investors across 14,000 companies worldwide, would enforce this mandate with engagement and voting.192
This position has generated both applause as well as criticism, as has
BlackRock’s decision to use its voting prowess to support controversial
shareholder proposals.193 Regardless of our beliefs about the merits of these
proposals, the fact remains that some BlackRock shareholders are opposed to
them.194 In theory, the corporate governance team is making a judgment call
about what is in the best long-term interest of its shareholders, and although
these teams are composed of experts, they too are human actors affected by
conflicts of interest—the desire to keep management or other clients happy, or
the desire to further their personal political goals.195 Because governance is
challenging to evaluate, it will rarely be clear whether any given vote was the
product of truly disinterested evaluation.

such as BlackRock, have begun to show interest. Sunny Oh, Think-Tank Funded by Koch
Brothers Challenges CalPERS’ ESG Strategy, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 12, 2017, 1:04 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/think-tank-funded-by-koch-brothers-challengescalpers-esg-strategy-2017-12-12 [https://perma.cc/6VMZ-2FBV].
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Larry Fink, 2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, BLACKROCK,
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter
[https://perma.cc/W9WE-L7PM] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019).
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Id. (describing BlackRock’s focus on company engagement).
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See, e.g., Matt Levine, Opinion, Larry Fink’s Warning to CEOs Rings Hollow,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 17, 2018, 2:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/201801-17/larry-fink-s-warning-to-ceos-rings-hollow (“It’s going to take more than a stronglyworded letter to create change.”); Sorkin, supra note 143 (hailing BlackRock’s move as a
“watershed moment on Wall Street”).
194
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Fund managers are more likely to vote in favor of management-sponsored proposals at
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III. CONFLICTED MUTUAL FUND VOTES SHOULD NOT COUNT AS
DISINTERESTED
When is a vote worthy of deference? Delaware courts have emphasized that
deference doctrines espoused in M & F Worldwide and Corwin are only
applicable when the vote is by disinterested decision makers. We contend that
Delaware should read this requirement to exclude mutual fund votes that are
prone to conflicts of interest, and specifically, those that may be the product of
Cross-Ownership Conflict or Corporate Client Conflict.196 In thoses situations,
the court has reason to be skeptical that the outcome of the vote is one that the
company’s undiversified investors would necessarily embrace.
We focus on mutual fund voting for several reasons. For one, the mutual fund
conflicts that we describe are relatively easy for courts to observe and measure.
In addition, mutual funds are unique in experiencing these recurring and
predictable conflicts: for example, pension funds, hedge funds, and retail
investors are not subject to the Corporate Client Conflict. Mutual funds are also
broadly diversified and generally adhere to a centralized governance model,
making the Cross-Ownership Conflict especially pronounced. Perhaps most
importantly, mutual funds are now the key decision makers in corporate votes—
they dictate the outcomes in M&A decisions as well as proxy contests and other
contested matters. And when the largest shareholders suffer from recurring
conflicts that pit them against the real parties in interest, the justification for
deferring to their decisions becomes increasingly tenuous.197
To be clear, we do not believe that the refusal to defer to conflicted votes will
necessarily reduce the influence of these conflicts in governance (and future
research should consider whether government regulation is necessary to ensure
196
We include the Uniform Policy Conflict in our typology for the sake of completeness,
but do not advocate that courts make an inquiry into this conflict as well. Most important, it
would be administratively difficult for courts to determine whether an investor’s votes were
being cast to benefit some other group of investors within the institution. Future research
should determine whether fund sponsors are doing enough to minimize the prevalence of this
conflict in voting. Compare Rock & Kahan, supra note 179, at 49 (contending that these
conflicts can be handled on case-by-case basis when they arise), with Lipton, Family Loyalty,
supra note 38, at 175 (contending that mutual fund boards should develop procedures to
ensure that fund shares are voted with view toward advancing best interests of that particular
fund).
197
This is not to say that hedge funds and pension funds do not suffer from conflicts of
interest as a result of intermediation—there is a large literature documenting these. We do not
address them here, however, for a few reasons. For one, these conflicts would be more
difficult for courts to observe. For example, public pension funds are appointed by politicians
or directly elected by voters and so may be especially sensitive to political pressure. See
Edward B. Rock, supra note 98, at 365. But determining whether a pension fund’s vote was
affected by political interests would be challenging and invite speculative arguments. In
addition, mutual fund conflicts are not only observable, they are pervasive. Recall the
evidence that mutual fund empty voting occurs with regularity; hedge fund empty voting,
despite its extensive treatment in the literature, is much rarer. See supra notes 120-23 and
accompanying text.
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that mutual fund fiduciaries use their governance rights to further their investors’
best interests).198 Instead, interpreting “disinterested” to exclude economic
conflicts will ensure that business judgment deference applies only when the
parties in interest have clearly spoken in favor of the transaction.
Although Delaware courts generally police conflicts at the director level,
considering conflicts at the shareholder level is not foreign to Delaware law. For
example, in In re CNX Gas,199 the Court of Chancery considered evidence of
Cross-Ownership Conflict in determining whether a large shareholder’s vote
could be counted for majority-of-the-minority approval of a tender offer.200 In
that case, Consol, a publicly traded company, was the majority shareholder of
CNX Gas and planned to buy out the public shareholders using a tender offer.
Like most companies, the vast majority of the public float was held by
institutional investors, and the largest minority shareholder was the mutual fund
sponsor T. Rowe Price. Accordingly, Consol approached T. Rowe Price and
negotiated an agreement for T. Rowe to sell all of its shares before proposing a
tender offer to the other minority shareholders.201
But T. Rowe also had a substantial minority stake in Consol, and one of its
funds held a significant amount of Consol debt.202 As such, T. Rowe stood on
both sides of the transaction—the incentive for Consol to pay top dollar was
dampened as a result of these cross-holdings. When the terms of the deal were
challenged by the other minority shareholders, the Court of Chancery
determined that the conflict rendered T. Rowe interested; T. Rowe was “fully
hedged and indifferent to the allocation of value between Consol and CNX
Gas.”203 As such, T. Rowe could not be counted for purposes of a majority-ofminority vote necessary to avoid a showing that the tender offer price was fair.204
In reaching this decision, the Court of Chancery recognized that it did not
intend to encourage “generalized fishing expeditions” into shareholder
motives.205 We likewise recognize that all shareholders hold private interests
that may cause their preferences to diverge from those of other shareholders.
Our aim is not to open the floodgates to litigation over all kinds of shareholder
interests, but rather to those that create a clear economic conflict of interest and
198
For example, Professor Lipton has proposed that one way to alleviate the CrossHolding Conflict would be to expand the right of appraisal for shareholders that have different
preferences. Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, supra note 38, at 140 (“Appraisal provides
a mechanism for satisfying the entire shareholder base.”). For a discussion of the existing law
regulating mutual fund conflicts of interest, see Lipton, Family Loyalty, supra note 37, at 17883.
199
4 A.3d 397 (Del. Ch. 2010).
200
Id. at 420.
201
Id. at 401-02.
202
Id. at 402 (noting T. Rowe Price owned 6.3% of Consol’s outstanding stock).
203
Id. at 416.
204
Id. (“T. Rowe Price[] has materially different incentives than a holder of CNX Gas
common stock . . . .”).
205
Id. at 417.
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that are easily observable by courts. As the Court of Chancery found, the conflict
facing T. Rowe put it in a very different position than the other shareholders.
And including T. Rowe as part of the “minority” would weaken the bargaining
position of the other minority shareholders.206
Although CNX Gas involved a tender offer, the logic applies to third-party
mergers and controlling shareholder transactions as well. And the argument is
likely to surface again in that context. When it does, courts should take into
account those conflicts before applying the deference doctrines espoused in M
& F Worldwide and Corwin. That is not to say that these deference doctrines,
which have done much good by screening out meritless litigation, should be
eliminated. Instead, we propose an analytical refinement that would take major
mutual fund shareholder conflicts into consideration before deference doctrines
are applied. First, drawing on CNX Gas, we provide a framework to guide
plaintiffs who wish to rebut M & F Worldwide or Corwin (and the courts who
must evaluate those arguments). Second, we describe how this approach would
benefit investors without unduly burdening transactional planners or leading to
meritless litigation.
We propose that if plaintiffs can present evidence (on the basis of a section
220 request or other public information) that either (1) the target or acquirer
company is a client of the fund family, or (2) the fund family has significant
cross-holdings in both the target or acquirer, then any shares voted subject to
such conflicts should not be treated as disinterested. The court’s inquiry could
end with this finding. The court need not evaluate evidence about the fund
family’s actual motives for voting—the presence of the economic conflict would
simply render those votes excluded from the Corwin/M & F Worldwide
calculus.207
Although section 220 requests may take time and generate litigation of their
own, the procedural posture of post-closing damages actions means that litigants
will have time for the section 220 process to play out. In addition, the discovery
burdens should be relatively easy for the company to manage. Information about
Corporate Client Conflict can generally be found in public company filings, as
can information about major shareholder cross-holdings. For information that is
not publicly available, the information sought is akin to a shareholder list. All of
this information is documentary. There is no need for depositions, expert reports,
or anything else that would drive up costs and create leverage on the plaintiffs’
side.
Had the Court of Chancery followed this approach in the Tesla litigation, it is
likely that 45.7% of the supposedly disinterested shareholders that voted to
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Delaware courts would need to consider what to do in cases where excluding conflicted
votes leaves only a small number of minority shareholders. In those cases, a very small
shareholder could nonetheless wield substantial influence over the vote, increasing the
potential for distortions and hold outs.
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approve the transaction would not have been counted.208 Tesla’s largest
institutional shareholder—Fidelity—would have also been excluded because it
had Corporate Client Conflict: Fidelity is the main recordholder of Tesla’s
401(k) accounts.209 And if these “yes” votes had been excluded, then the
transaction would have received approval from less than 40% of the
disinterested stockholders210—not enough to render it eligible for business
judgment rule protection. In other words, this approach would have permitted
litigaton to proceed without requiring the court to designate Musk—who had
only a 22% stake in Tesla—as a controlling shareholder.
This approach is also consistent with the rationale used by courts that apply
deferential business judgment protection to transactions approved by
disinterested shareholders: when the parties in interest have spoken, courts
should not second guess their choices. When there is clear evidence indicating
that the parties in interest did not speak in favor of the transaction, and those
who did had a reason to vote against their interests, it is especially important to
preserve an opportunity for judicial review. If, for example, the largest
shareholders may be inclined to follow management in order to preserve access
or to benefit another investment, we can be less certain that the underlying
transaction will benefit the ultimate investors. As we saw in the Tesla-SolarCity
merger, conflicted shareholders may be quick to say yes even when the
transaction’s undesirable features are visible to everyone that is looking.
Additionally, a key benefit of a minority-of-the-majority voting requirement
is that it operates to protect minority shareholders ex ante. If management wants
the deal to be accepted without litigation risk, it will need to ensure that the
transaction is desirable for the disinterested minority. However, when conflicted
voters can drown out the disinterested minority, management will have to worry
less about negotiating a deal that will secure their approval. Recall that nearly
46% of Tesla’s “disinterested” shareholders were also SolarCity investors.
Although management could not be certain that those cross-holders would vote
yes for that reason, the conflict made disinterested shareholder approval more
likely, despite (and perhaps because of) the obvious fact that the deal was a rotten
one for Tesla. Indeed, Tesla’s four largest stockholders stood to lose over half a
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billion dollars in the event of a SolarCity bankruptcy.211 And as discussed, Tesla
is not an isolated example.212
Interpreting M & F Worldwide and Corwin to exclude shareholders with
economic conflicts of interest means that management will have to work harder
to ensure that the transaction is fair to the real parties in interest if it wants to
avoid judicial review. In addition, excluding conflicted shareholders improves
the bargaining position of minority shareholders who may have concerns about
the merger. The result: better M&A outcomes for minority shareholders. That is
so even if management responds to this doctrinal shift by utilizing a majorityof-the-minority vote less often. In such cases, minority shareholders will have
another source of protection—the Delaware courts, who will consider whether
the transaction was entirely fair to them.
We recognize that M & F Worldwide and Corwin arose out of concerns about
a rapid increase in nonmeritorious litigation over M&A transactions—litigation
that benefitted plaintiffs’ lawyers at the expense of investors and taxpayers. But
we think that considering conflicts at the large shareholder level would not
dramatically change the operation of those doctrines. As discussed, a 2010 study
analyzing M&A deals involving publicly traded companies during 1998-2004
revealed that in 41.7% of the deals, the acquiring and target firms shared some
of the same owners.213 This means that the majority of mergers do not involve
Cross-Ownership Conflict, and therefore, in the majority of cases, the deference
doctrines espoused in M & F Worldwide and Corwin would apply without
change. Furthermore, the study revealed that when cross-holdings existed, the
cross-holders made up 18.9% of the company’s shareholders on average.214 In
many cases, therefore, excluding the cross-holders would not likely change the
outcome of the vote. Of course, plaintiffs can also look for evidence of client
relationships as a source of conflict between the institutional investor and the
merger. However, companies generally only use a single mutual fund family to
manage their 401(k) assets—therefore, that conflict would only affect, at most,
two mutual fund sponsors in any given deal. In sum, even though the incidence
of Cross-Ownership and Corporate Client Conflicts is substantial, considering
these conflicts will not neuter the operation of the deference doctrines that have
done much to control abusive litigation. Instead, our proposed approach would
ensure that the use of these doctrines is limited to the situations where they are
likely to do the most good.
Likewise, the prospect of discovery on shareholder conflicts is unlikely to
change the bargaining position of litigants and create pressure for defendants to
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Amended Verified Derivative Complaint at 16-17, In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder
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settle. As discussed, information about Corporate Client and Cross-Ownership
Conflict is easy to find in public documents; anything that is not publicly
available could be produced in a section 220 request. In addition, transactional
planners will be able to easily respond by accounting for conflicts ex ante, when
they are structuring the transaction.
In sum, considering these economic conflicts would preserve judicial scrutiny
of mergers in situations where conflicts likely influenced the outcome of the vote
without undoing the benefits that M & F Worldwide and Corwin provide
transactional planners and shareholders.
CONCLUSION
This Article has analyzed the impact of mutual fund conflicts of interest on
shareholder voting. It has described typical conflicts arising from intermediated
mutual fund ownership. It has also argued that honest acknowledgment of these
conflicts requires specific changes to Delaware corporate law. Doing so would
serve to realign institutional voting with investor interests, thereby alleviating
the potential inefficiencies created by the spread of intermediary shareholding.
Of course, this Article only scratches the surface in analyzing how conflicts
of interest affect mutual fund voting. Although conflicts likely affect decisions
on other issues, we have here confined ourselves to issues arising in M&A
transactions. In addition, we focused on Delaware corporate law remedies, rather
than suggesting broader regulatory reform. We leave those projects for another
day.

